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SECOND-CLASS CITIZENSHIP: THE
TENSION BETWEEN THE SUPREMACY OF
THE PEOPLE AND MINORITY RIGHTS
ADAM H. MORSE*

Ballot measures that amend state constitutions to prevent
minority groups from gaining legal rights, such as the ability of
gay and lesbian couples to enter into legally recognized marriages,
pose difficult problems in constitutional law. Voters should
generally have the power to enact initiatives that overturn court
decisions about state constitutional provisions. The relative ease
with which state constitutions can be amended allows for a useful
dialogue between state courts and voters. At the same time, a
serious danger of "intertemporal lock-ups" exists, where the voters
of today impose their will on a different majority tomorrow,
particularly when the majority seeks to exclude a discrete minority
from achieving its political goals. Minority groups ought to have a
right to seek legislative redress, notwithstanding defeats in prior
ballot measures. I argue that the Equal Protection Clause protects
a fundamental right of access to the political process: the right of
all independently identifiable groups to compete equally, although
not necessarily to succeed, in the political process.
Initiatives addressing same-sex marriage provide an ideal
case study for balancing the political rights of minority groups
with those of the majority for three reasons. First, the issue of
same-sex marriage has produced a complicated interplay between
court interpretations of state constitutional provisions and ballot
measures amending state constitutions. Second, several states
have adopted ordinary legislation permitting same-sex marriage,
establishing the relevance of access to the political process for gays
and lesbians. Third, gays and lesbians constitute a well-defined
minority that has not been recognized as a suspect or quasisuspect class by federal courts.
Numerous state initiatives and referenda in the last decade
have addressed the legality of same-sex marriage. The California
voters narrowly passed Proposition 8, a state constitutional
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Texas Tech School of Law; B.A., Yale
University; J.D., New York University. I received many helpful comments
from Burt Neuborne, Rick Hasen, Daniel Lowenstein, Betsy Rosenblatt,
Julian Yap, Matthew Feigin, Tracy Strong, Michael Davis-Wilson, and Anise
K. Strong. I want to thank them for their comments and critiques.
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amendment to "Eliminate the Right of Same-sex Couples to
Marry," on November 4, 2008.1 Proposition 8 purports to reverse
the recent California Supreme Court decision, In re Marriage
Cases,2 and to prohibit the California Legislature from authorizing
same-sex marriages as well.3 Many, but not all, of the previous
initiatives and referenda addressing same-sex marriage confirmed
the legal status quo-initiatives like California's Proposition 22
from 2000, enacted at a time when marriage was already limited
to different-sex couples in California.4 Proposition 22 served
mostly to demonstrate popular opinion against same-sex marriage,
although it did have a prospective effect of eliminating the ability
of the California Legislature to authorize same-sex marriage. In
contrast, amendments passed in Hawaii5 and Alaska6 responded to
court decisions that had cast doubt on the constitutionality of
limiting marriage to different-sex couples.7 The amendments to
the state constitutions effectively settled the question. Ballot
measures can also respond to legislative actions on the question of
same-sex marriage; Maine's legislature recently passed a statute
authorizing same-sex marriage, but a petition for a "people's veto"
suspended the statute from going into force and a referendum at
the 2009 general election repealed the statute.8
Ballot measures addressing same-sex marriage raise serious
and complicated questions regarding the rights of political
participation protected by the United States Constitution. From
the perspective of gays and lesbians, constitutional amendments
that limit marriage to different-sex couples impose a form of
second-class citizenship. In addition to the obvious concern that
limiting marriage to different-sex couples marks people in same1. Proposition 8 passed by a margin of 52.3% to 47.7%. CALIFORNIA
SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE, NOVEMBER 4, 2008, GENERAL
ELECTION, at 62 (2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008
general/sovscomplete.pdf.
2. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (2008) (holding that the California
Constitution gives same-sex couples the right to marry).
3. Proposition 8 purports to add a new Section 7.5 to Article I of the

California Constitution, stating in full: "Only marriage between a man and a
woman is valid or recognized in California." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
4. Proposition 22 is codified as CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (Deering 2010)
("Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California."). When Proposition 22 was passed on March 7, 2000, California
law stated, "Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract
between a man and a woman, to which the consent of the parties capable of
making that contract is necessary." CAL. FAM. CODE § 300(a) (Deering 2010)
(emphasis added).
5. HAw. CONST. amend. II.
6. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25.
7. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Brause v. Bureau of Vital
Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Feb. 27, 1998).
8. Act of May 6, 2009, ch. 82, 2009 Me. Laws 82 (repealed Nov. 3, 2009, by
referendum).
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sex couples as inferior, the amendments limit the ability of gays
and lesbians to pursue their goals through the ordinary legislative
process. The possibility of authorizing same-sex marriages through
the political process is not theoretical: prior to Proposition 8's
passage, the California Legislature had passed a bill that
purported to permit same-sex marriages without court
intervention, although Gov. Schwarzenegger vetoed the bill.9
Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, and the District of Columbia
0
have also each passed statutes legalizing same-sex marriage,'
although a referendum overturned Maine's statute."
From the perspective of opponents of same-sex marriage,
ballot measures like California's Proposition 8, Alaska's Ballot
Measure 2 (1998), and Hawaii's Constitutional Amendment 2
(1998) play a vital role in maintaining the democratic legitimacy of
government. State constitutional amendments prevent a state
supreme court from imposing its policy preferences on the people
as a whole.12 To those opponents, the risk of second-class
citizenship comes from the danger that all of the people will be
reduced to second-class citizenship under the watchful tutelage of
the supreme court justices.
Because of the tension between these two conceptions of
democratic rights, ballot measures concerning same-sex marriage
provide an ideal opportunity to analyze the question of whether
the Fourteenth Amendment limits the ability of voters to reduce

9. The California Legislature passed AB 849, which would have
established gender-neutral marriage, on September 6, 2005. AB 849, 2005-06
Sess. (Cal. 2005) (vetoed Sept. 29, 2005, by Gov. Schwarzenegger). The
Legislature passed a similar bill, AB 43, in September 2007. AB 43, 2007-08
Sess. (Cal. 2007) (vetoed Oct. 12, 2007). Because a prior California legislative
initiative limited marriage to different-sex couples, the bills in the legislature
would have needed to be submitted to the voters prior to becoming effective,
unless the prior initiative was itself unconstitutional. See CAL. CONST. art. II,
§ 10(c); California Ballot Proposition 22 (2000), codified at CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 308.5 (Deering 2010). Nonetheless, the bills show the substantial possibility
that gays and lesbians could win a political fight over the definition of
marriage in California.
10. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2010) (enacted Apr. 7, 2009, over Governor's
veto); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (2010); Act of May 6, 2009, ch. 82, 2009
Me. Laws 82 (repealed Nov. 3, 2009, by referendum); Religious Freedom and
Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009, Leg. No. B18-0842 (D.C.
2009) (signed by the Mayor, Dec. 18, 2009; scheduled to go into effect on March
2, 2010).
11. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF
ELECTIONS, AND COMMISSIONS, 2009 REFERENDUM
CORPORATIONS,
2
TABULATION (2009), available at http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/ 009/refer
endumbycounty.html.
12. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 651-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing Supreme Court majority for substituting its judgment for that of
the people of Colorado and noting that the Supreme Court's judgments reflect
the judgments of lawyers and other elites rather than the people as a whole).
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the legal rights of minorities through ballot measures. I do not
address the issues related to the distinction between "revisions"
and "amendments" that the California Supreme Court considered
in Strauss v. Horton.'3 I also do not repeat the arguments about
whether a substantive right to same-sex marriage exists under the
United States Constitution.14 In Perry v. Schwarzenegger,15 a

district court judge in the Northern District of California ruled
that Proposition 8 violated both the fundamental right to
marriage, protected under the Due Process Clause, and the rights
of gays and lesbians to equal protection of the law. While Perry
would render the specific legal issues discussed in this Article
moot if it is ultimately affirmed, Proposition 8 and similar ballot
initiatives would remain useful as a case study for the
fundamental right to participate in the political process. The
defendant-intervenors in Perry have also announced their intent to
appeal, and the decisions of the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme
Court will ultimately control, rather than the district court
decision.
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN
THE POLITICAL PROCESS

The right to participation in the political process developed in
response to efforts by predominantly white majorities to prevent
African-Americans from passing anti-discrimination legislation
through the ordinary political process. In 1969, the Supreme Court
ruled in Hunter v. Erickson that the City of Akron could not
13. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 60-62 (2009), reh'g denied (rejecting
arguments that Proposition 8 constituted a "revision" that had to originate in
the Legislature rather than an "amendment" that could originate with an
initiative petition).
14. A large literature addresses the constitutionality of same-sex marriage.
For books and articles supporting a right to same-sex marriage under the
federal Constitution, see, for example, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE
FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT
(The Free Press 1996); MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
AND THE CONSTITUTION (Cornell University Press 1997); EVAN WOLFSON,
WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: AMERICA, EQUALITY, AND GAY PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO

MARRY (Simon & Schuster 2004); Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the
Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184 (2004); Josephine Ross, Riddle for
our Times: The Continued Refusal to Apply the Miscegenation Analogy to
Same-Sex Marriage, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 999 (2002); but see generally, e.g.,
Maggie Gallagher, What Is Marriage For? The Public Purposes of Marriage
Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 773 (2002); Lynn D. Wardle, "Multiply and Replenish"Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital
Procreation,24 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL'Y 771 (2001). See also, Paul Axel-Lute,
Same-Sex Marriage: A Selective Bibliography of the Legal Literature (Dec. 18,
2009), http://law-library.rutgers.edu/SSM.html (providing a useful but
incomplete bibliography of the legal literature on same-sex marriage).
15. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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amend its charter such that any city ordinance that sought to
remedy housing discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or
ancestry would not take effect until approved by a majority vote in
a referendum.1 6 The Akron City Council had enacted an ordinance
prohibiting housing discrimination in 1964.17 Voters responded by
initiating and passing a charter amendment that purported to
both nullify the previously passed ordinance and to create a new
procedural requirement of a referendum for any future antidiscrimination legislation.18 The Supreme Court struck down the
charter amendment as invalid.
The Court's reasoning in Hunter relies both upon precedents
about the right to an equally weighted vote and upon the "most
rigid scrutiny" to which classifications based on race are subject.19
The arguments based on political participation amount to the
conclusion that, while Akron has significant flexibility in
structuring its political process, it does not have the power to
require some groups of people to overcome a higher burden in
achieving their legislative goals. The Court held that Akron could
require a referendum before any ordinance became law but could
not apply that requirement solely to laws sought by a specific
minority. At the same time as Hunter addressed the exclusion
from the political process in general, however, it also underlined
the particular need to protect against exclusion from the political
process based on race. Hunter simultaneously started the
"fundamental right to participate in the political process" line of
cases and raised the largest unanswered question about the
doctrine: does it actually protect a fundamental right for all
groups, or is it simply a manifestation of the general equal
protection scrutiny applied to racially discriminatory legislation? 20
The Supreme Court applied Hunter in connection with later
cases litigating the ability of initiatives to rollback gains by
minorities. A pair of cases addressed initiatives that banned the
use of compulsory busing to achieve integrated schools. In
Crawford v. Board of Education, a California initiative reversed a
state Supreme Court decision requiring the use of busing. 21 In the
companion case of Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,
Washington voters prohibited local school boards from
implementing busing to achieve integration, thus superseding a
policy voluntarily adopted by the Seattle school board to integrate
its schools. 22 A closely divided Supreme Court applied Hunter in
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392-94 (1969).
Id. at 386.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 392.
For further discussion of this issue, see infra Part III.
Crawford v. Bd. Of Educ. of L. A. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 461-63 (1982).
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both cases but reached opposite results. The Court upheld the
California constitutional amendment, reasoning that the people of
California necessarily retained the authority to determine what
their own constitution means. 23 Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, noted the apparent contradiction in a rule that would
prevent states from amending their constitution to be less
protective of minority rights, even though they could have initially
adopted a less protective constitution. 24
In the Seattle case, however, the Supreme Court focused on
the fact that the state of Washington delegated substantial
authority to local school boards, including the power to adopt
policies governing school assignment, yet sought to take away the
ability of a school board to pursue integrated schools through
busing. 25 Seattle School DistrictNo. 1 fell squarely within Hunter's
doctrine. Washington did not need to use local school boards, but
having done so, it could not deprive African-Americans of the right
to seek policies that they viewed as desirable on an equal basis
with other voters. 26 Again, as with Hunter, the Court used
language suggesting both a fundamental rights analysis and a
racial discrimination analysis.2 7
Hunter and its progeny raise two questions. First, what
limitations on participation in the political process implicate the
Fourteenth Amendment? Second, what groups have a protected
right of access to the political process: only racial minorities, any
suspect class, any quasi-suspect class, independently identifiable
groups that have been subjected to animus, any independently
identifiable group, or even groups definable only in terms of policy
preference? Both of these questions affect whether any of the
limitations on same-sex marriage violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. 28
23. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 539-40.
24. Id. at 535.
25. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 474-482.
26. Id. at 487.
27. See, e.g., id. at 467. The Court stated:
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
racial minorities the right to full participation in the political life of the
community. It is beyond dispute, of course, that given racial or ethnic
groups may not be denied the franchise, or precluded from entering into
the political process in a reliable and meaningful manner. But the
Fourteenth Amendment also reaches "a political structure that treats all
individuals as equals," yet more subtly distorts governmental processes
in such a way as to place special burdens on the ability of minority
groups to achieve beneficial legislation.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 84 (1980).
28. Mark Strasser analyzes Hunter's implications for initiatives amending
state constitutions to preempt litigation seeking same-sex marriage rights in
Mark Strasser, From Colorado to Alaska by Way of Cincinnati: On Romer,
Equality Foundation,and the Constitutionalityof Referenda, 36 HOUS. L. REV.
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II. DEGREE OF ACCESS TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS REQUIRED
The magnitude of the effect a constitutional amendment or
similar change has on a group's access to the political process can
be evaluated using two different criteria. First, the processes for
amendment differ significantly. Second, amendments differ in
scope. Either aspect could in theory be important to determining
the reach of the fundamental right of political participation
doctrine.

A. The DoctrinalRole of the Amendment Process
State constitutions vary significantly in their amendment
processes. 29 Some states allow future amendments by a simple
majority vote on an initiative,30 while others require supermajority
votes in the legislature followed by a ballot measure 3' or repeated
actions over the course of several election cycles. 32 To the extent
that a straightforward and reasonable opportunity exists to
reverse a constitutional amendment, an argument can be made
that groups that are disadvantaged by the amendment are not
actually excluded from participating in the political process, but
rather have their participation channeled into a single
mechanism.
While numerous variations exist, the requirements to reverse
constitutional amendments or ballot measures prohibiting samesex marriage fall into four major categories. The most restrictive
category encompasses states that require supermajorities to
amend their constitutions. Some states require a supermajority in
the legislature followed by a simple majority vote in a ballot
measure. 33 Others require a supermajority vote on a ballot
measure.34 Supermajority requirements raise the clearest concerns
1193, 1232-1237 (1999). His analysis of Hunter does not fully consider the
broader issues of democratic government raised by anti-same-sex marriage
amendments.
29. For a complete catalogue of the amendment processes in all fifty states,
see infra Part IV.
30. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b), art. XVIII, §§ 3-4 ("[a] proposed
amendment or revision shall be submitted to the electors and if approved by a
majority thereon takes effect .... ).
31. See, e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. C (requiring three-fifths vote in each
house of the legislature followed by a two-thirds popular vote).
32. See, e.g., IOWA CONST. art. X, § 1 (requiring majority votes in both
houses of the legislature in two consecutive legislative sessions separated by
an election followed by a referendum).
33. See, e.g., KAN. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 (requiring a two-thirds vote in each
house of the legislature followed by a majority vote in a referendum); KY.
CONST. § 256 (requiring a three-fifths vote in each house of the legislature
followed by a majority vote in a referendum); see also DEL. CONST. art. XVI,
§ 1 (requiring a two-thirds vote in two consecutive legislative sessions, without
a requirement of popular ratification).
34. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 5 (requiring sixty percent popular
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in terms of access to the political process because they imply that
even if a disfavored group builds the support of a majority of the
electorate, it may still be unable to achieve its goals.35 The second
category requires a sustained majority-approval by a majority of
two successive legislatures and then a majority of the vote on a
ballot measure or the like.36 Requirements of a sustained majority
significantly increase the difficulty of achieving political victories,
but allow a consistent majority to prevail. The third category
encompasses states that allow amendments through a simple
majority.3 7 Several states, including California, permit voters to
initiate and adopt a constitutional amendment through a simple
majority vote in a single election. 38 In other states, the legislature
can propose an amendment with a simple majority that can then
be ratified by a simple majority of the people in the same election
cycle. 39 In some states, including California, statutory initiatives
also have the same basic effect in terms of limiting access to the
political process-a simple majority on a future initiative can
overturn the initiative, but the initiative binds the legislature. 40
The final category covers amendments that overturn state court
vote to ratify constitutional amendments); N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. C (requiring
a three-fifths vote in each house of the legislature followed by a two-thirds
vote in a referendum).
35. Some constitutions go beyond even supermajority requirements for
certain provisions, making some provisions unamendable or amendable only
through a special process. The most familiar such provision is the United
States Constitution Article V limitation on reductions in equal representation
in the Senate without consent. U.S. CONST. art. V. But some states and many
foreign countries place certain basic rights into this category. See, e.g., OHIO
CONST., art. VII, § 5 ("But no alteration of this constitution shall ever take
place, so as to introduce slavery or involuntary servitude into this State.");
UTAH CONST. art III, § 1 ("The following ordinance shall be irrevocable
without the consent of the United States and the people of this State: First: -Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed . . . but polygamous or
plural marriages are forever prohibited."); GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [BASIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY] art. LXXIX, § 3 ("Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the
division of the Federation into Lander [States], their participation on principle
in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall
be inadmissible.") An unamendable provision would present the issue of
exclusion from the political process even more starkly than a supermajority
requirement. No state has adopted an unamendable restriction on same-sex
marriage.
36. IND. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. X, § 1.
37. ARIZ. CONST. art. XXI, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b).
38. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b); ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 1, amended by ARK.
CONST. amend. 7.
39. ARIZ. CONST. art. XXI, § 1.
40. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c) (explaining that the Legislature "may
amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective
only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits
amendment or repeal without their approval').
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constitutional decisions, without restricting future efforts to
achieve the same effect through the legislative process. Hawaii's
amendment in response to litigation over same-sex marriage
provides an exemplar: it explicitly granted the legislature the
power to prohibit same-sex marriage without requiring that the
legislature exercise that power, thus ending any state
constitutional claims to a right to same-sex marriage without
reducing the access of gays and lesbians to the ordinary political
process. 41 This category would also cover the Maine "people's veto"
and similar provisions allowing for ballot measures to nullify
statutes passed by the legislature without imposing any future
restrictions on legislation.42
As a matter of doctrine, the Supreme Court's decisions in
Hunter, Crawford, and Seattle School District No. 1 fairly
definitively resolve which degrees of exclusion from the political
system present a constitutional issue. Hunter itself dealt with a
city charter amendment that could be reversed by an initiative
signed by ten percent of the voters of Akron and then passed by a
majority of the voters at the next election. 43 The Supreme Court's
discussion of the charter amendment process demonstrates that it
believed that African-Americans in Akron had access to a
reasonable, practical method to achieve their fair-housing political
goals. 44 They could have gathered petition signatures and then
campaigned to seek a majority vote in favor of their preferred
policies. Hunter declared that access to one reasonable political
method to achieve their goals was insufficient where any other
group could either pursue the normal ordinance process through
the city council or seek to muster a majority of the vote on a
charter amendment. 45 Hunter's logic applies with equal force to a
provision like Proposition 8 that prohibits the California
legislature from authorizing same-sex marriages, simply
substituting constitution for city charter and statute for ordinance.
Just like the African-Americans in Akron, gays and lesbians can
achieve their political goals by passing an initiative with a simple
majority at an election but cannot pursue those goals through the
legislature. As Hunter acknowledged, a government can shift all
decision making to a system of popular votes such as a traditional
New England town meeting without implicating the Equal
41. HAw. CONST. art. I, § 23.
42. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing the right to
political participation and possible preclusion of political defeats).
43. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 387.
44. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392 n.7 ("The people of Akron had the power to
initiate legislation, or to review council decisions, even before § 137 . . . [t]he
procedural prerequisites for this popular action are perfectly reasonable, as
the gathering of 10% of the voters' signatures in the course of passing § 137
illustrates.") (citations omitted).

45. Id.
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Protection Clause,46 but requiring one group to use that system
while all other groups can choose whether to use that mechanism
or a different mechanism raises serious concerns. And, of course,
Hunter's logic applies with even more force to limits on political
participation that would require supermajorities or sustained
majorities to reverse.
If charter amendments and state constitutional amendments
that eliminate access to the ordinary legislative process can violate
the Equal Protection Clause despite the option of overturning
those amendments with a simple majority, then statutory
initiatives that have the same practical effect should be treated
similarly. California's Proposition 22 adopted precisely the same
language as Proposition 8 as a statute, rather than as a
constitutional amendment. 47 Under the California Constitution, a
statute passed by initiative binds the legislature,48 although of
course it does not bind the California courts in their interpretation
of the state constitution. Thus, for purposes of Hunter, Proposition
22 limited the ability of gays and lesbians to pursue the
legalization of same-sex marriage just as effectively as Proposition
8. Statutory initiatives in California require a smaller number of
petition signatures (five percent of the vote in the last
gubernatorial race versus eight percent for amendments), but that
difference does not provide a significant reason to allow statutory
initiatives to constrain legislative action in ways that a
constitutional amendment could not, especially in light of the
professionalization of the petition signature gathering process.
Many observers believe that higher petitioning requirements
increase the costs of putting an initiative on the ballot without
requiring any meaningfully greater popular support due to the
increasing importance of professional signature gathering. 49
46. A New England town meeting style system for governing a state would
presumably violate the Republican Form of Government Clause. See, e.g.,
Samuel B. Johnson, The District of Columbia and the Republican Form of
Government Guarantee, 37 How. L.J. 333, 359 (1994) (contrasting townmeeting-style democracy with republican government and noting that "For the
early Americans, 'republican' may have meant 'representative government.");
In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891) (holding that "the distinguishing
feature of [the republican] form is the right of the people to choose their own
officers for governmental administration, and pass their own laws in virtue of
the legislative power reposed in representative bodies. . ").
47. Compare CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 ("Only marriage between a man and
a woman is valid or recognized in California.") with CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5
(2010) ("Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California.").
48. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c).
49. See John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy and Social Issues 17-18 (May
2007) (unpublished manuscript) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=989682
(finding that the effects of different signature requirements for initiatives on
the outcomes on social issues are small and not statistically significant); see
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An argument could be made that the frequent use of statutory
or constitutional initiatives in California political practice defines
the initiative process as part of the ordinary political life of
California. That raises obvious administrative difficulties-how
common does use of an initiative system have to be in order to
render it fully adequate access to the political process? Even
beyond the administrative difficulties, Hunter's logic precludes
that interpretation. Hunter and its progeny defend the right to
compete on a fair playing field-not the right to prevail, but the
right for protected groups to have as much opportunity to pursue
their objectives through the political process as any other group.
Continuing the sports analogy of a fair playing field, imagine a
game of football in which one team can score either by touchdowns
or by field goals while the other can score only by touchdowns.
Touchdowns are a reasonable way to score in football and are in
fact often more desirable than field goals. Nonetheless, allowing
one team multiple ways of scoring and the other one would be
grossly, and obviously, unfair.
Ballot initiatives that simply reverse state court decisions,
such as the Hawaii same-sex marriage amendment, must pass
muster because that is precisely analogous to Crawford. Crawford
establishes that a right to political participation does not preclude
political defeats with regard to substantive rights under a state
constitution.50 Likewise, Hunter acknowledged that the people of
Akron could have nullified the fair-housing ordinance through an
initiative without violating the Constitution, as long as they
allowed room for future political action on the subject.5 1The Maine
"people's veto" thus raises no constitutional issues under the right
to political participation.
While many initiatives fall neatly into one category, some
cross categories. California's Proposition 8 functions both as an
initiative reversing In re Marriage Cases-permitted under
Crawford-and as a bar on future legislative action. Allowing all
groups except gays and lesbians the right to achieve their political
goals regarding marriage through the legislature makes
Proposition 8 comparable to the Washington initiative in Seattle
School DistrictNo. 1.
In order to reconcile those two competing interpretations of
the amendment, courts should unpack Proposition 8 into its logical
also Larry L. Berg & C.B. Holman, The Initiative Process and its Declining
Agenda-Setting Value, 11 LAw & POL'Y 451, 452 (1988) (arguing that
successful signature gathering processes are increasingly professionalized).
Signature requirements may be relevant to outcome. However, the point is
that variations in signature requirements appear to have relatively small
effects.
50. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 542.
51. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392-93.
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component parts. If Proposition 8 had two sections, one of which
overturned In re Marriage Cases and one of which eliminated the
ability of the California Legislature to authorize same-sex
marriages, the application of Crawford and Seattle School District
No. 1 would be straightforward. 52 The section overturning In re
Marriage Cases would be constitutional under Crawford, and the
would be
section limiting the California Legislature
1.
While the
No.
District
School
Seattle
under
unconstitutional
unitary
a
single
it
as
structured
8
drafters of Proposition
unconstitutional
save
its
to
serve
provision, that should not
application to restrict the California Legislature. Instead, the
unconstitutional application of Proposition 8 should be struck
down, with the severability of the constitutional (at least in terms
of the fundamental right to participate) portion of Proposition 8 as
the only remaining question.
The hypothetical of a binary constitutional amendment on
same-sex marriages is not far-fetched. A 1998 Alaska
constitutional amendment had precisely that structure in its
original draft. The Alaska amendment as drafted stated, "To be
valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only
between one man and one woman. No provision of this constitution
may be interpreted to require the State to recognize or permit
marriage between individuals of the same sex."5 3 Under my
analysis of Hunter and its progeny, the first sentence would be
unconstitutional, but the second sentence would pass muster.
B. The Scope of Exclusion from the PoliticalProcess
Provisions that exclude a group from the political process also
vary in terms of substantive scope. Within the context of
prohibitions of same-sex marriage, some amendments apply solely
to the term "marriage." California's Proposition 8 has been
construed by the California Supreme Court to prevent the use of
the term "marriage" for future legal relationships within a samesex couple while noting that the California Constitution continues
52. This assumes that Hunter and Seattle School DistrictNo. 1 recognize a
fundamental right of access to the political process independent of a suspect
classification. For a discussion of whether those cases depended on a suspect
classification, see infra Part III.
53. Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d 979, 988, n.57 (Alaska 1999). The Alaska
Supreme Court ordered the second sentence struck from the proposed
amendment as surplusage and because of a concern that it could result in
prosecutions of people in marriage-like relationships not sanctioned by the
state. The amendment as adopted consists only of the first sentence of the
draft amendment. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25. It is also worth noting that the
Alaskan amendment was not a voter-initiated amendment; under the Alaska
Constitution, amendments must first be passed by a two-thirds vote of each
house of the legislature and then adopted by a majority vote of the population.
Bess, 985 P.2d at 982.
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to require the state to offer the same substantive rights to samesex couples as to different-sex couples. 54 Conversely, Utah's samesex marriage amendment prohibits same-sex marriage or the
creation of any same-sex relationship with a substantially
equivalent legal effect to marriage.5 5
The scope of exclusion from the political process could in
principle play a role in triggering scrutiny under the fundamental
right to participate. Some of the language in Romer v. Evans
emphasizes the "sweeping and comprehensive . .. change in legal

status"56 instituted by Colorado's Amendment 2, which purported
to eliminate any "protected status based on homosexual, lesbian,
or bisexual orientation."57 Romer is a complicated case with regard
to arguments about a fundamental right of political
participation-depending on how it is read, it can either provide
substantial support for the existence of such a right or foreclose
those same arguments.5 8 Nonetheless, Romer is relevant because
of Justice Kennedy's emphasis in the majority opinion on the wide
scope of Amendment 2. In explaining the difficulty in applying
rational basis review to the Amendment, Justice Kennedy noted
that the Amendment had the "exceptional" and "peculiar property
of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single
named group,"59 from which he concluded that the basis for the
Amendment was improper animus. Romer thus does raise some
possibility that the scope of exclusion could affect the validity of a
constitutional amendment limiting the ability of gays and lesbians
to seek the opportunity to marry.
The cases that deal more directly with access to the political
process, however, do not focus on the breadth of the restrictions at
issue. Hunter did not dwell on the importance of fair-housing
statutes within the political goals of African-Americans, nor did it
address the opportunities for other victories within the city
government.6 0 Likewise, neither Crawford nor Seattle School
District No. 1 appeared to turn on the relative importance of
busing programs in promoting integrated schools.61 Rather, the
only question is whether the relevant governmental body had
responsibility for other similar matters. The lack of emphasis on
breadth of restrictions suggests that the state could remove all
54. Strauss 207 P.3d at 60-62.
55. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29.
56. Romer, 517 U.S. at 627.
57. See id. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST. amend. 2).
58. See infra Part III.B (noting that Romer did not explicitly rely on a
fundamental right of political participation, despite the fact that the court
below did, but still incorporated reasoning related to political access in
striking down the law under review).
59. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
60. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 386-96.
61. Crawford, 458 U.S. 527; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457.
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responsibility for marriage law from a given decision-making body
without implicating Hunter. A state does implicate Hunter,
however, by allowing the legislature to control marriage law
within broad parameters but nonetheless eliminating the ability of
gays and lesbians to pursue even the purely symbolic yet
important label of marriage.
III. THE ROLE OF A SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION IN HUNTER
All of the decisions by the United States Supreme Court
striking down initiatives for eliminating the right to participate in
the political process have dealt with initiatives that interfered in
the ability of African-Americans to achieve their goals through
ordinary legislative means. Extending the Hunter line of cases to
invalidate state constitutional amendments that limit the access of
gays and lesbians to the political process raises the question of
whether there is, in fact, a fundamental right to participate in the
political process, or whether Hunter should be understood as an
application of strict scrutiny to a suspect classification. If the right
to political participation is a fundamental right, than strict
scrutiny would apply regardless of whether the group deprived of
the right to participate is a suspect class. 62 As Pamela Karlan has
noted, "double-barreled" precedents like Hunter can be very
slippery-a court can always distinguish one component of the
analysis by pointing to the other component as the real meaning of
the case. 63
A. The Supreme Court Precedent on the FundamentalRight to

Participate
Hunter contains language suggesting that its holdings go
beyond suspect classes. While Hunter relies on a host of cases
involving discrimination against racial minorities, its discussion of
the law of democracy relies as much on non-racial right to vote
cases as on cases addressing racial discrimination. 64 Hunter cites
Anderson v. Martin,6 5 which struck down a law listing the race of
candidates on the ballot, and Gomillion v. Lightfoot,6 6 about the
racial gerrymandering of Tuskegee to exclude African-American
voters, but it also relied on Reynolds v. Sims 67 and Avery v.
62. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
445 (1985) (suggesting that if a particular minority group was "powerless to
assert direct control over the legislature" such lack of control could be used as
a "criterion for higher level scrutiny by the courts").
63. Pamela S. Karlan, Just Politics? Five Not So Easy Pieces of the 1995
Term, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 289, 296-97 (1997).
64. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391-93.

65. 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
66. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
67. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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Midland County,6 8 cases addressing malapportionment of election

69
districts that were not based on any suspect classification. The
Hunter majority stated in connection with its citation of the
malapportionment cases:
Even though Akron might have proceeded by majority vote at town
meeting on all its municipal legislation, it has instead chosen a more
complex system. Having done so, the State may no more
disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to
enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person's vote or
give any group a smaller representation than another of comparable
size. 70

The statement that a state may not disadvantage "any
particular group" can only be transformed into an inability to
disadvantage only suspect classes by assuming that the Supreme
Court was being very sloppy in its writing.
Conversely, Seattle School District No. 1 appears to rely more
heavily on racial discrimination than Hunter did. Seattle School
DistrictNo. 1 uses Hunter as the core benchmark for its analysis of
why Washington's decision to prohibit local school boards from
using busing to promote integration, but its language focuses on
the need to prevent the exclusion of racial minorities from the
political process.7 1 The sentences in Seattle School District No. 1
that address access to the political process consistently either
specifically mention race or speak of excluding "minorities"-a
72
term that can easily be interpreted in racial terms. Seattle
School District No. 1 is not inconsistent with a broader right of
political participation that would apply to "any particular group,"
to use the language from Hunter. Nonetheless, the language of
Seattle School District No. 1 provides scant support for the
fundamental rights reading of Hunter.
The Supreme Court has never directly answered whether a
fundamental right to political participation exists separate from
the rights of suspect classes. In Gordon v. Lance,73 the Court
rejected a challenge to a West Virginia constitutional provision
requiring a referendum with the approval of 60% of the voters in
order to authorize a political subdivision to raise taxes or issue
bonds. While the Court's analysis focused on whether this law
deprived proponents of tax increases of the right to an equally

68. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
69. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391-93.

70. Id. at 392-93.
71. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 470 ("In our view, Initiative 350
must fall because . . . it uses the racial nature of an issue to define the
governmental decisionmaking structure, and thus imposes substantial and
unique burdens on racialminorities.") (emphasis added).
72. Idat 470-84.
73. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
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weighted vote, it also rejected a Hunter-based challenge as well. 74
In contrast to Hunter, the West Virginia law did not disadvantage
a "'discrete and insular minority,"'75 but applied equally to all bond
issues. The Court stated that it could "discern no independently
identifiable group or category that favors bonded indebtedness
over other forms of financing. Consequently, no sector of the
population may be said to be 'fenced out' from the franchise
because of the way they will vote."76
While relevant, the handful of sentences in Gordon that
address Hunter do not resolve the issue of the existence of a freestanding right to political participation. The reference to "discrete
and insular minorities" could be read as limiting Hunter to
protecting suspect or quasi-suspect classes, particularly in light of
the long history of that phrase, dating back to CaroleneProducts
footnote 4,77 as identifying the rationale for providing some groups
with additional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Conversely, Gordon could be read as merely requiring an
"independently identifiable group or category" in order to apply
the right to participate cases. Notably, Gordon did not frame its
decision specifically in terms of the absence of racial
discrimination.78 The Court could have easily written a statement
to the effect of "Hunter'sholding applies solely to racial minorities
and other suspect classes." The absence of any such language, at a
minimum, leaves the question of whether Hunter protects an
independent fundamental right open.
B. Rational Basis Review and the Right to PoliticalParticipation

Moving beyond the core cases relying on Hunter, other
Supreme Court cases dealing with hard issues in Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence have also discussed access to the political
process in ways that illuminate the question of whether a freestanding fundamental right of political participation exists. Both
of the major Supreme Court cases that invalidated government
action under ostensibly rational basis review contained important
language about access to the ordinary democratic process.
Furthermore, if those cases are understood as prohibiting animus,
they raise peculiar issues in analyzing bans on same-sex marriage
such as Proposition 8. Finally, the cases that analyze which level
of scrutiny should apply to various classifications put substantial
emphasis on access to the political process-suggesting that rights
of political participation are at the core of the Equal Protection
74. Id. at 5.
75. Id.

76. Id. See also James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding the
requirement of a referendum to approve construction of low-income housing).
77. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
78. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5.
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Clause's meaning.
1. Language about Democracy in "RationalBasis Plus" Cases
The Supreme Court has decided two major cases striking
down statutes under rational basis review: City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc.79 and Romer v. Evans.so The majority
opinions in both cases contain substantial language discussing
political opportunity. Neither case definitively supports a
fundamental right to political participation, but both emphasize
the importance of the lack of opportunity to seek political redress
in finding an equal protection violation. Taken together, they
provide some limited support for a fundamental right of political
participation independent of the rights of suspect and quasisuspect classes.
On its face, City of Cleburne did not involve access to the
political process at all, and yet the majority opinion focused a
surprising amount of attention on the lack of a potential political
solution. City of Cleburne dealt with whether a city regulation that
blocked a group-home for adults with mental disabilities violated
the Equal Protection Clause.81 The Court rejected arguments that
people with mental disabilities should constitute a suspect or
quasi-suspect class, but nonetheless struck down the zoning
regulation under rational basis review. 82 The most interesting
thing about the City of Cleburne decision for present purposes,
however, is its language about democracy. When the Court first
states the general rule that regulations that do not involve suspect
or quasi-suspect classes must merely have a rational basis, it
justifies that rule by noting that "the Constitution presumes that
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the
democratic processes." 83 In contrast, the Court justifies the
heightened scrutiny for laws involving suspect classes in part
"because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by
legislative means."8 4 City of Cleburne thus recognizes that lack of
access to the political process is a key reason to provide greater
protection under the Equal Protection Clause-a recognition that
inherently raises questions about whether specifically depriving a
group of access to the political process violates the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The next major case in which the Supreme Court struck down
a law under rational basis Equal Protection review is Romer v.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

473 U.S. 432 (1985).
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
City of Cleburne, 472 U.S. at 435.
Id. at 442-50.
Id. at 440.
Id.
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Evans.85 The majority opinion in Romer is slippery, and its
implications for a fundamental right of political participation are
unclear. The best place to start our analysis is with the decision of
the Colorado Supreme Court that Romer affirmed.
The Colorado Supreme Court decision in Evans v. Romer
turned directly on the question of whether an independent
fundamental right to political participation exists. 86 The Colorado
Court invalidated Colorado's Amendment 2, which purported to
ban any anti-discrimination laws or laws providing "protected
status" to gays and lesbians.87 The plaintiffs in Evans did not
argue that gays and lesbians were a suspect class.88 The majority
held that they nonetheless constituted an identifiable group with a
fundamental right to participate in the political process, and thus
applied strict scrutiny to Amendment 2.89 The dissent, in contrast,
treated Hunter and its progeny as dependent on a suspect
classification.9 0
The United States Supreme Court applied a different analysis
in Romer after granting certiorari and neither endorsed nor
rejected the Colorado Supreme Court's approach in the course of
striking down Amendment 2 as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.9 1 Unfortunately, Romer's reasoning is opaque and hard to
untangle. Is it a decision based on the sweeping (and, according to
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, unprecedented) nature of
Colorado's Amendment 2?92 Is it a decision based on a conclusion
that the Colorado voters were motivated by animus against gays
and lesbians? 93 Is it a decision about the fundamental right to
participate in the political process, striking Amendment 2 down
because it would permit all other minorities except gays and
lesbians to receive protection against discrimination through the
ordinary political process? 94 Does Romer embody a more
idiosyncratic interpretation of Equal Protection, such as a pariah
principle or an anti-subordination and caste principle?9 5 Each
85. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
86. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993). Because the Colorado
Supreme Court remanded, a second Evans v. Romer decision also exists, 882
P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994). Evans I contains all of the interesting analysis for the
purposes of this Article.
87. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1272.
88. Id. at 1275.
89. Id. at 1275-86.
90. Id. at 1296-1302 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
91. Romer, 517 U.S. at 626.
92. Id. at 632-33.
93. Id. at 634-35.
94. Id. at 633 ("Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government
and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its
assistance."); Karlan, supra note 63, at 296.
95. See generally Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The PariahPrinciple,
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interpretation has its own difficulties, and the reality is probably a
mix of several considerations.
While Romer does not explicitly rely on a fundamental right
to political participation, like City of Cleburne, it contains
language emphasizing the importance of redress from the political
process. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion stresses that "the
amendment imposes a special disability upon those persons alone.
Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or
may seek without constraint. They can obtain specific protection
against discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado
to amend the State Constitution or perhaps, on the State's view,
by trying to pass helpful laws of general applicability." 96 The
inability to "seek [legal redress] without constraint" or to obtain
protection without amending the state constitution deprived gays
and lesbians of precisely the same opportunities that a
fundamental right to political participation would protect. The
majority opinion also describes Amendment 2 as particularly
unique, and unusually questionable, because of a "disqualification
of a class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from
the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence."9 7 Indeed, some of
Justice Kennedy's language could be viewed as a paraphrase of a
statement of a fundamental right to political participation: "A law
declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of
citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is
itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal
sense."9 8 A right to seek aid from the government on the same
terms as all other groups describes precisely what a fundamental
right to political participation would protect.
Justice Scalia, in dissent in Romer, argued that the majority
had "implicitly reject[ed]" 99 the Colorado Supreme Court's holding.
Justice Scalia's statement seems simply wrong as a matter of the
ordinary effect of a decision affirming on an alternate ground.10 0
The majority opinion in Romer could have stated that the Colorado
Supreme Court's analysis was wrong, but it did not. Where a
superior court affirms on an alternate ground without either
rejecting or endorsing the lower court opinion, it should be
understood as explicitly leaving open the question of whether the
13 CONST. COMMENTARY 257 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste
Principle,92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994).
96. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
97. Id. at 633.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 640 n.1.
100. See Strasser, supra note 28, at 1232-33 ("However, two claims should
not be conflated: (1) the United States Supreme Court based its decision upon
a rationale that differed from that offered by the Colorado Supreme Court and
(2) the Court explicitly (or at least implicitly) stated that the rationale offered.
. . would not support the holding in Romer.").
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lower court was correct. Numerous reasons could support such a
decision. For example, the Court could want to allow further
percolation on a difficult question while resolving the case on an
easier basis. Alternately, the Court could have granted certiorari
to address a specific question and not want to deal with other
questions. Avoiding ruling on the reasoning of the court below also
could be necessary to preserve a single majority opinion. Assuming
two or more of the concurring justices in Romer were unwilling to
reject the Colorado Supreme Court's rationale, Justice Kennedy
would have lost his majority had he addressed the Hunter
argument directly. A narrower decision could easily serve the
interests of the Court by deliberately leaving the question of
Hunter's scope unclear.101

Moreover, Justice Scalia sought to have it both ways: he both
stated that Justice Kennedy rejected the Colorado Supreme
Court's reasoning and yet argued that the majority's decision could
only be understood as based on political process rights. As noted
above, Justice Scalia stated in footnote 1 at the beginning of Part
II of his opinion that "the Court implicitly rejects the Supreme
Court of Colorado's holding that Amendment 2 infringes upon a
'fundamental right' of 'independently identifiable class[es]' to
'participate equally in the political process."'102 Two short
paragraphs earlier, however, Justice Scalia began the forceful
conclusion of Part I of his opinion by stating that "[t]he central
thesis of the Court's reasoning is that any group is denied equal
protection when, to obtain advantage (or, presumably, to avoid
disadvantage), it must have recourse to a more general and hence
more difficult level of political decisionmaking than others."10 It
seems hard to reconcile Justice Scalia's two statements, that the
majority rejected a fundamental right to participate equally in the
political process and yet that the majority's "central thesis"
involved precisely that sort of right. One possibility would be to
interpret Justice Scalia's distinction as entirely one of
terminology-that the Romer majority rejected the language of a
fundamental right of political participation, yet concluded that
101. Pamela Karlan argues that Justice Kennedy may have wanted to avoid
relying on Hunter in Romer to avoid an implication that gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class based on the "doublebarreled" nature of the decision in Hunter. Karlan, supra note 63, at 297-304.
While Karlan's argument may be correct in explaining Justice Kennedy's
decisionmaking, it does not address a related point. The Court could have
decided Romer on the basis of a fundamental right to political participation
while explicitly rejecting a need to show a suspect class in order to prove a
political participation claim. Because the Colorado Court did essentially that,
Justice Kennedy must have deliberately chosen to avoid framing Romer purely
in terms of fundamental rights.
102. Romer, 517 U.S. at 640 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 639 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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depriving a group of equal access to the democratic process would
violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The better interpretation of Justice Scalia's dissent, however,
focuses on the two competing purposes that a dissenting opinion
can serve. On the one hand, dissenting opinions seek to
demonstrate that the majority opinion is wrong-ideally to
persuade some members of the majority to not ultimately join its
opinion, but failing that, to persuade future judges to reject the
reasoning of the majority opinion.104 At the same time, a justice
can use a dissenting opinion in an effort to shape the
interpretation of the majority opinion. 05 In Romer, Justice Scalia
attempted to do both through a bit of judicial sleight-of-hand. In
his criticisms of the majority's opinion, he acknowledged the
important role that access to the political process for redress of
grievances played in the majority's decision as a means to try to
marshal support against the majority.106 Yet he also emphasized
that the majority's decision rested on a "rationale different"1 0 7
from the Colorado Supreme Court's decision as "implicitly
reject[ing]" 0 8 any purported fundamental right of political
participation in an effort to interpret the majority's opinion. Each
statement served one of Justice Scalia's purposes in dissent, but
neither provides a reliable tool for interpreting the majority
opinion in Romer that Justice Scalia rejected.
2. BanningAnimus and a Strange One-Way Ratchet
The most straightforward reading of City of Cleburne and
Romer reduces their holdings to a requirement that government
action have some basis other than animus, but rational basis
review based on preventing animus produces particular problems
when applied to amendments banning same-sex marriage. If a law
fails rational basis review under Romer if the sole, or perhaps even
principal, reason for its enactment is animus against a specific
group, then initiatives reversing state-court decisions permitting
same-sex marriage should be unconstitutional. Even before In re
Marriage Cases, California enacted a domestic partnership law
that provided same-sex couples with essentially the same legal
rights-but not the same label-as marriage.109 Proposition 8, at
104. See, e.g., Maurice Kellman, The Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 SUP. CT.
REV. 227, 239-40 (1985) (describing the reasons behind a judge's dissent);
CHARLES CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 74-75 (Houghton Mifflin 1947)
(describing the reasons behind a judge's dissent).
105. See Kellman, supra note 104, at 259-65 (describing the "damage
control" behavior of dissenting justices).
106. Romer, 517 U.S. at 639-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 626 (majority opinion).
108. Id. at 640 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 397-98 ("California ... in recent
years has enacted comprehensive domestic partnership legislation under
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least on its face, would do nothing to eliminate the ability of samesex couples to enter into domestic partnerships. Instead,
Proposition 8's sole effect is a statement of disapproval-saying, in
effect, "whatever those partnerships are, they are not real
marriages." Many gays and lesbians value the right to marry, at
least in part, because it comes with a statement of acceptance and
establishes the normativity of their relationships."10 Proposition 8
serves precisely to eliminate that statement of acceptance and
normativity and instead to label same-sex relationships as inferior
and disfavored."' Applying an anti-animus principle, a law whose
sole purpose is to express the government's animus against a class
of people fails to serve any rational government purpose.112 Put
another way, the government can act for many reasons, including
reasons that reflect poor judgment, but it cannot act to devalue a
portion of the populace by branding their most intimate
relationships as inferior to the majority's comparable
relationships.
To be sure, proponents of Proposition 8 would defend it as

which a same-sex couple may enter into a legal relationship that affords the
couple virtually all of the same legal obligations and duties, that California
law affords to and imposes upon a married couple.").
110. Id. at 434-35, 452-53.
111. Some argue that refusing the label of "marriage" makes same-sex
domestic partnerships different without being inferior. However, the whole
rationale for reserving the term "marriage" for different-sex unions is that
marriage is special and unusually meritorious, and that same-sex
relationships should not be entitled to the same recognition. See ARGUMENT IN
FAVOR OF PROPOSITION 8, VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE FOR THE NOVEMBER 4,

2008 GENERAL ELECTION, available at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/g
enerallargu-rebut/argu-rebutt8.htm. It states:
[Proposition 81 protects our children from being taught in public schools
that "same-sex marriage" is the same as traditional marriage.
Proposition 8 protects marriage as an essential institution of society.
While death, divorce, or other circumstances may prevent the ideal, the
best situation for a child is to be raised by a married mother and
father.... We should not accept a court decision that may result in
public schools teaching our kids that gay marriage is okay.
Id. (emphasis in original). That context, as well as in the overall context of the
history of official condemnation of homosexuality and of same-sex
relationships, demonstrates that people seek to put a different label on samesex domestic partnerships precisely to mark those relationships as inferior.
112. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35. It states:
A second and related point is that laws of the kind now before us raise
the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected. "If the constitutional
conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at
the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically

unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1965)).
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preserving "traditional" marriage.1 3 In a sense, their arguments
are true, although the arguments parallel those of advocates of
segregation who described segregation as intended to preserve
traditional definitions of community and marriage rather than
Preserving the
seeking to oppress African-Americans."4
"traditional" definition, when that definition excludes one group
because their relationships were traditionally viewed as inferior
and proscribed, amounts to the same thing in practice as making a
decision based on animus against that group.
Moreover, the same arguments proponents of Proposition 8
would advance today could be made in defense of Colorado's
Amendment 2-indeed, Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer made
those very arguments.115 Traditionally, gays and lesbians were not
protected against discrimination but instead faced prosecution for
any sexual activity.116 Justice Scalia argued vigorously that the
state had historically sought to discourage homosexuality and to
brand it as unacceptable, and that continuing that tradition did
not represent some new "fit of spite" but rather an acceptable act
in a "Kulturkampf."" 7 Of course, Justice Scalia relied on Bowers v.
Hardwick,"5 a precedent that the Supreme Court has since
repudiated in Lawrence v. Texas." 9 Lawrence only makes the
argument against Proposition 8 stronger-if animus against gays
and lesbians could not provide a rational basis for Amendment 2
at a time when states could constitutionally criminalize
homosexual conduct, how can animus against gays and lesbians
possibly provide a rational basis for Proposition 8 today?
Striking down Proposition 8 on an animus analysis would
produce a bizarre one-way ratchet result, where a state could
choose to not permit same-sex marriage yet would be unable to
ban same-sex marriage if it is legalized. Romer's anti-animus
doctrine appears at its strongest when dealing with a purely
symbolic law, affecting only who can use certain highly valued
labels like "married," "husband," and "wife." Yet unless the federal
courts are willing to take the further step of declaring a federal
right to same-sex marriage in all states, invalidating initiatives

113. ARGUMENT INFAVOR OF PROPOSITION 8, supra note 111.
114. See Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955) (upholding Virginia's
anti-miscegenation law and stating "[tlhe institution of marriage has from
time immemorial been considered a proper subject for State regulation in the
interest of the public health, morals and welfare, to the end that family life ...
may be maintained . .. in accordance with established tradition and culture . .
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Romer, 517 U.S. at 636-653 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 640-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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like Proposition 8 would create a paradoxical one-way ratchet.120
Under that odd interpretation, states could choose to maintain
existing bans on same-sex marriages, but once same-sex marriages
are legal, any subsequent law banning same-sex marriages would
be unconstitutional as motivated only by animus. Imposing a oneway ratchet would seem particularly inappropriate in this case,
where it would ignore the interplay between the California courts
and the people of California. If the people of California could
choose not to recognize marriages of same-sex couples without
violating the federal Constitution prior to In re Marriage Cases,
they should not lose that power simply because the California
courts made a ruling under the state constitution.
The Colorado Supreme Court's decision, with its reliance on a
fundamental right of participation in the political process, avoids
the difficulties created by Romer. Protecting the right of gays and
lesbians to participate in the political process does not create a
constitutional one-way ratchet. Instead, it reserves the questions
to a political resolution where the rights of minorities fluctuate
according to their political success.
3.

The Role of PoliticalAccess in Identifying Suspect Classes

Cases analyzing the appropriate level of scrutiny for various
classifications routinely discuss access to the political process and
ability to seek redress through democracy. To the extent that a
group is politically powerful and able to protect itself through the
democratic process, the Supreme Court tends to conclude that the
group does not need the protection of heightened scrutiny. Thus, in
the section of City of Cleburne rejecting intermediate scrutiny for
classifications based on mental disabilities, Justice White noted
the successes of people with mental disabilities in achieving
political goals through the ordinary legislative process as
"negat[ing] any claim that the mentally retarded are politically
powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the
120. Some aspects of Perry appear to rely on an anti-animus rationale. For
example, the court states:
In the absence of a rational basis, what remains of proponents' case is
an inference, amply supported by evidence in the record, that
Proposition 8 was premised on the belief that same-sex couples simply
are not as good as opposite-sex couples. . . . Whether that belief is based
on moral disapproval of homosexuality, animus towards gays and
lesbians or simply a belief that a relationship between a man and a
woman is inherently better than a relationship between two men or two
women, this belief is not a proper basis on which to legislate.
Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1002. The bulk of Perry's reasoning would invalidate
all laws limiting marriage to different-sex couples and would thus avoid the
one-way ratchet that I discuss. To the extent that either the Ninth Circuit or
the Supreme Court affirms because of the animus motivating Proposition 8, as
discussed in Perry'sfact-finding, it would create the one-way ratchet.
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attention of the lawmakers."121 Their access to the legislative
process was important precisely because it indicates heightened
scrutiny is appropriate when "discrimination is unlikely to be soon
rectified by legislative means." 22 Likewise, Lyng v. Castillo held
that classifications based on immediate family relationships were
not suspect in part because "they are not a minority or politically
powerless."123 While political powerlessness is only one of the
factors considered in evaluating whether a class is suspect, the
Supreme Court has presented those factors in the disjunctive,
suggesting that any one of "the traditional indicia of suspectness"
might be sufficient: if the class is "saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process."1 24
Fewer cases conclude that a classification is suspect or quasisuspect based on a lack of political power, but the constitutional
pedigree remains strong. In many ways, the touchstone for
questions of whether a classification is suspect remains footnote 4
of Carolene Products: "whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." 125
While prejudice matters, it matters in significant part because it
"curtail[s] the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities."126 Scholars working on the issue
of the countermajoritarian difficulty often focus on the
Constitution's special role in protecting groups that cannot protect
themselves through the democratic process.' 27 Several of the
recent state supreme courts that have analyzed whether
classifications based on sexual orientation should face heightened
scrutiny have also given extensive consideration to the question of
whether gays and lesbians remain politically disempowered.128
121. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445.
122. Id. at 440.
123. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 675, 678 (1986).
124. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); see
also Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam)
(quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28).
125. CaroleneProducts, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
126. Id.
127. The classic text on this remains JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (1980) (arguing that judicial review is justified despite its
countermajoritarian effects to the extent that it protects the functioning of the
democratic process or protects minorities that cannot protect themselves
through ordinary politics).
128. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 893-95 (Iowa 2009)
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Likewise, Perry made extensive findings of fact about
discrimination against gays and lesbians, including findings that
they did not have access to the normal political process. 129 Perry
concluded that "the evidence presented at trial shows that gays
and lesbians are the type of minority strict scrutiny was designed
to protect;"130 while the only specific citation to the factual findings
in support of this conclusion was a citation to findings about the
lack of relevance of sexual orientation to legitimate judgments
about capabilities, the extensive findings about the history of
discrimination and political defeats surely provides some of the
evidentiary support for Perry'sconclusion.
The doctrine that classifications are suspect or quasi-suspect
based in part on whether they can rely on the ordinary political
process for protection provides strong support for a fundamental
right of political participation. Heightened scrutiny serves to
examine laws that cannot otherwise be adequately judged in a fair
and open democratic process. Suspect classifications thus
represent, in part, a proxy for identifying violations of a more
general right to participate in democratic politics for redress. If
suspect classifications serve as a proxy for judging when an
identifiable group lacks the ability to use the democratic processes
for its benefit, a direct exclusion from participation in the political
process should be subjected to strict scrutiny as well. Applying
strict scrutiny to direct exclusions from the political process is
precisely the effect of recognizing a fundamental right of political
participation.
C. Resolving the Issue of Whether the Right to Political
ParticipationDepends on a Suspect Classification
The range of groups protected by Hunter's doctrine can be
limited in at least five different ways. At one extreme, it could
apply only to suspect classes. The next broader category would
protect quasi-suspect classes as well-indeed, even interpreting
Hunter as based on a suspect class analysis, without any
fundamental rights component, would imply intermediate scrutiny
(discussing the political powerlessness of gays and lesbians); Kerrigan v.
Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 439-44 (Conn. 2008) (comparing the
political power of gays and lesbians with the political power of women to
conclude that gays and lesbians are a quasi-suspect class).
129. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 987, 973-991. In particular, see Id. at 987

("'[I]f the group is envisioned as being somehow * * * morally inferior, a threat
to children, a threat to freedom . . . , then the range of compromise is

dramatically limited. It's very difficult to engage in the give-and-take of the
legislative process when I think you are an inherently bad person."')
(alteration in original) (quoting Gary Segura, a political scientist and expert
on the political power/powerlessness of minority groups).
130. Id. at 121. Note that this statement is arguably dicta; see infra note 131
and accompanying text.
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for laws excluding quasi-suspect classes from the political process.
To the extent that federal courts may in the future apply
heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual
orientation, 131 constitutional prohibitions on same-sex marriage
131. Federal courts have thus far generally applied rational basis review to
classifications based on sexual orientation. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec'y of Dept. of
Children & Family, 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 2004) (reviewing the Florida
statute under the rational basis test); Equal. Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 128
F.3d 289, 292-293 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining why a Cincinnati Charter
Amendment was not subject to heightened scrutiny); Holmes v. Cal. Army
Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying a rational basis
test); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1996) (arguing that the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy should be reviewed on a heightened scrutiny
standard); High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,
573-574 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the district court's determination that
homosexuals deserve heightened scrutiny); Woodward v. United States, 871
F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that homosexuality is not a quasisuspect or suspect class); Rich v. Sec'y of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th
Cir. 1984) (holding that the equal protection clause claim fails because
homosexuality is not a suspect class); but see Witt v. Dept. of the Air Force,
527 F.3d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Lawrence requires something more than
traditional rational basis review" as a matter of substantive due process).
Some scholars argue that Romer applied some form of "rational basis plus"
review. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientationand Heightened Scrutiny,
102 MICH. L. REV. 1528, 1529 (2003) (explaining that the rational basis text
may consist of two tiers of review); Gill v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 699 F.
Supp. 2d 374, 386-388 (D. Mass. 2010) (applying, arguably, some form of
rational basis plus or rational basis with teeth). Gill struck down the portions
of the Defense of Marriage Act that purported to deprive same-sex couples
married under Massachusetts law of federal benefits. Gill explicitly applied
rational basis review, but because the court rooted its conclusions in Romer's
anti-animus language, it arguably applied some form of slightly heightened
rational basis review. Most of the cases addressing the level of scrutiny
applied to classifications based on orientation preceded Lawrence and relied on
the now-repudiated Bowers. Federal courts may revisit the issue in the future
in light of Lawrence.
Perry applied rational basis review but also stated that "the evidence
presented at trial shows that gays and lesbians are the type of minority strict
scrutiny was designed to protect." Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997. This
statement is arguably dicta, in light of Perry's ultimate conclusion that
Proposition 8 cannot survive rational basis review and the court's statement
that "the court need not address the question whether laws classifying on the
basis of sexual orientation should be subject to a heightened standard of
review." Id. We will have to wait to see whether the Ninth Circuit or the
Supreme Court will affirm Perry, and if so, whether they will apply heightened
scrutiny, but Perry represents a major step toward applying heightened
scrutiny in the federal courts.
Several state courts have applied either strict or intermediate scrutiny
to classifications based on sexual orientation. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 876-906;
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 425-461; In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 384 (2008).
While the state courts applying heightened scrutiny have relied on their state
constitutions, several courts based their analysis on the standards applied by
the United States Supreme Court in determining the correct level of scrutiny
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 425-461; see also
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would likely violate Hunter's doctrine even if simple laws limiting
marriage to different-sex couples did not. 132 The next broader
category would protect against irrational, animus oriented
restrictions on the political rights of groups, in the tradition of the
rulings in Romer and Cleburne. Evans applied the doctrine to a
still broader category, any "independently identifiable group,"133
which encompasses any group defined by something more than a
simple policy preference. Finally, Hunter could be applied most
broadly to even groups defined only in terms of their policy
preferences.
Gordon forecloses as a matter of doctrine the broadest
application of Hunter as protecting groups defined solely in terms
of their policy preferences. 134 If Hunter protects groups defined by
policy preferences, then the group of people who support increased
education spending ought to be within its protection. Gordon
squarely rejects that possibility. 135 Moreover, an interpretation
that protected all policy preferences would call into question vast
swathes of state constitutional law. Any provision that is not
purely structural could be criticized because some group would be
excluded from seeking to achieve their goals. Many states have
constitutional provisions guaranteeing a right to bear arms.136
Should all of those provisions be invalidated as depriving gun
control advocates of their right to seek favorable laws? In states
like California in which statutory initiatives bind the legislature,
the broadest reading of Hunter would even invalidate many
statutory initiatives. While a plausible constitutional theory could
be constructed in which the only permissible topics for
constitutions are structural matters and protections for minority
rights, an effort to constitutionalize that rule through the Equal
Protection Clause would contradict the well-established history of
Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 876-906 (explicitly patterning its interpretation of a
state constitution Equal Protection Clause on the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretations of the federal Equal Protection Clause). This raises the
possibility that federal courts will follow their reasoning in the future. The
appropriate level of scrutiny is beyond the scope of this Article.
132. For the reasons articulated in several of the state constitutional
decisions invalidating bans on same-sex marriages, see, for example, Kerrigan,
957 A.2d at 425-61. I believe that those bans cannot survive intermediate
scrutiny as a substantive matter. Fully exploring that question would require
a different article.
133. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1276.

134. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 182 (1939) ("Most if not
all of the States have adopted provisions touching the right to keep and bear
arms."); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("Every citizen shall have the right to keep
and bear arms in the lawful defense of himself or the State; but the
Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms, with a
view to prevent crime.").
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more substantive constitutional restrictions in American practice.
The more difficult issue is whether Hunter protects any
independently identifiable group or whether it requires something
more. Hunter's reasoning depended on the exclusion of AfricanAmericans from the political process, not merely on the
substantive law regarding fair housing.' 37 Hunter did not establish
a right to have fair-housing laws in place at the municipal level. 138
Rather, it held that a city charter could not be amended to make it
more difficult to enact fair-housing laws than other laws.139 While
that amendment applied in effect only to racial minorities, the
right at issue was fundamentally procedural. Because of the broad
protection of rights to equal participation in the political process in
other areas, limiting Hunter to protecting the rights of suspect
classes is an unnecessarily constrained reading.
If Hunter and its progeny do not depend on a suspect-class
analysis but protect any independently-identifiable group, the
current doctrine strikes a sensible balance between the interests of
allowing state law to develop and experiment while protecting the
political participation rights of minority groups. Efforts by current
majorities to entrench their positions, and in particular to
entrench policies that oppress a minority, represent a major
problem in constitutional law. If a disfavored minority group can
gain political advantage in the future, basic notions of equality
require that they have the same opportunity to use their increased
political clout. Likewise, changing the rules of the game to deprive
a minority group and its allies of their local successes represents a
fundamentally unfair approach to allocating power among
different levels of government. Many policy considerations
legitimately contribute to determining whether a local government
should be entrusted with certain powers, but taking away powers
from a school district, city council, or county government because
of a fear that the wrong type of people will gain power represents
an illegitimate effort to disenfranchise. The disenfranchisement is
not literal-the minority group affected still gets to formally cast
their votes. Nonetheless, if a group of voters has lost the ability to
actually achieve its goals, those voters have been functionally
disenfranchised.
These arguments apply with equal force to minority groups
defined by some characteristic other than a suspect or quasisuspect classification.140 A law that excluded gays and lesbians
137. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392.
138. Id.; Id. at 395-96 (Harlan, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 392-93.
140. Several constitutional amendments provide specific protections to the
voting rights of certain suspect and quasi-suspect classes. U.S. CONsT. amend.
XV (right to vote "shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (right to vote
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from voting, or that reduced the weight of their votes, would be
just as unconstitutional as one that prevented or underweighted
the votes of African-Americans. By analogy, a law that says that
gays and lesbians can vote but cannot achieve their goals without
amending the constitution functionally disenfranchises them.
The difficulty with this analysis is how to distinguish between
the independently identifiable groups and policy-based groups. A
law that literally disenfranchises proponents of gun control would
be equally unconstitutional as one disenfranchising an
independently identifiable group. 141 Proponents of gun control are,
however, a clear example of a policy-based group. Nothing defines
the category of proponents of gun control except for their
agreement on a policy issue. While some gun control advocates
share characteristics that are independently identifiable-such as
being the victims of gun violence-the connection seems too weak,
especially because not all victims of gun violence would seek
increased gun control laws. Of course, not all gays and lesbians
support same-sex marriage. A strong tradition within queer
thought opposes the institution of marriage as oppressive and
patriarchal and argues that queer people should oppose the
institution of marriage altogether.142
Moreover, the distinction between independently identifiable
groups and policy-based groups can be fuzzy. Consider the case of
laws limiting the purchase of alcohol or of other drugs. People who
want to be able to legally purchase alcohol can be viewed as an
independently identifiable group-the group of drinkers. Or they
can be viewed as simply a policy preference group-the group of
people who support legal alcohol sales, perhaps because they want
"shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of sex.") While these
amendments provide additional protection for the voting rights of racial
minorities and of women, modern Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence
would clearly also secure the voting rights of both racial minorities and
women. In general, cases addressing racially discriminatory rules in election
law tend to be litigated as much under the Fourteenth Amendment as under
the Fifteenth.
141. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 ("To the extent Davis held that persons
advocating a certain practice may be denied the right to vote, it is no longer
good law.") (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969) (per curiam)).
142. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask for: Why
Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not 'Dismantle the Legal Structure
of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993) (expressing why
many feminist, lesbian women do not wish to be mainstream by getting
married); but see Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage
Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men, and the Intra-Community Critique, 21
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 567 (1994-95) (opining that homosexuals
should resist oppression by being allowed the right to marry someone of the
same sex). I use the term "queer thought" here specifically to focus on parts of
the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered community that self-identify as
queer in opposition to the norms of the "straight" community that they
consider oppressive.
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to drink, but nonetheless united by preference, not by identity.
One tool for identifying whether a provision entrenches a
policy preference or excludes the preferences of an independently
identifiable group relates to whether the issue can be framed
naturally in terms of the "rights" of the group. In cases like Hunter
and Romer, the charter or constitutional amendments at issue did
not simply resolve general policy questions; instead, they
established that African-Americans on the one hand and gays and
lesbians on the other could not gain the legal rights they sought
even through majority support in the ordinary legislative body.
The right to integrated schools, the right to access to the housing
market free of discrimination, the right to marry a person
regardless of the person's race or sex-all of these fall naturally
into the contested space of what rights exist. The fundamental
right of political participation should not depend on whether an
underlying right exists-Hunter would have been unnecessary if
African-Americans had a pre-existing right to fair housing. Rather,
because what was at stake in Hunter was whether a group would
have access to the political process to establish their rights, it
makes sense to invoke a fundamental right of political
participation to protect the group's access to the political process.
Conversely, policy preferences like gun control or opposition to
high taxes do not have nearly the same intuitive connection to
rights. We can speak of a right to be free of guns or a right to low
taxes, but they do not tie into the same core idea of rights. That
supports the conclusion that people who seek gun control or people
who seek to limit taxation are not independently identifiable
groups entitled to have unimpaired access to the political process.
Despite the difficulties, Hunter is best understood as read in
Evans as protecting any independently identifiable group. The
borders of the doctrine are fuzzy, but a certain indeterminacy is
hardly unique to this area of the law. The key conceptual
distinction that justifies treating independently identifiable groups
differently from groups defined solely by policy preferences is the
question of whether a law excludes people from the political
community. Limitations that block the policy preferences of a
group that can only be defined in terms of its policy preferences
serve as limitations on the decisionmaking of the polity as a
whole-limits on our collective ability to make certain decisions.
When the limitations fall on an independently identifiable group,
they function as limitations on "the other," and an exclusion from
full participation in the political society. That exclusion raises
serious Equal Protection concerns. In order to fully understand the
difference, we should analyze this in terms of the distinction
exclusionary
and
strategies
pre-commitment
between
entrenchment of current majorities, the topic of Part IV.C.
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IV. THE VALUE OF DIALOGUE OVER THE MEANING OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONS

Any analysis of the federal Constitutional checks on the
ability of voters of a state to amend their constitution must
consider the overall effects on how state constitutional
interpretation and amendment actually works. Constitutional
lawyers tend to think about interpretation and amendment in
terms of the United States Constitution, which has been formally
amended only twenty-six or twenty-seven times over the course of
slightly more than two centuries. 143 Despite its familiarity to
constitutional lawyers, however, the federal Constitution is not the
norm. The United States Constitution is much harder to amend
than any state constitution and is in fact an outlier among other
national constitutions in how difficult it is to amend.144
State constitutions, in contrast, are vastly more malleable.
The California Constitution has been amended more than 500
times,145 and the people can amend it by a simple majority vote on
a voter-initiated ballot measure.146 Moving beyond California,
Donald Lutz's comparison of amendment processes concluded that
despite differing forms of amendment, most state constitutions are
easily amendable, with slightly more than half tied for the
distinction of most easily amendable.147
143. The count depends on whether the ratification of the Congressional pay
increase amendment, proposed as part of the Bill of Rights and purportedly
ratified in 1992 as the Twenty-seventh Amendment, was valid. See generally
Sanford Levinson, Authorizing Constitutional Text: On the PurportedTwentySeventh Amendment, 11 CONST'L COMMENTARY 101 (1994).
144. Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 259-61 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
145. HAROLD W. STANLEY AND RICHARD G. NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON
AMERICAN POLITICS 301 tbl. 8-2 (2006) (reporting that the current California
Constitution had been amended 207 times).
146. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 3-4. More substantial "revisions" of the
California Constitution must receive the support of two-thirds of each house of
the legislature and then be approved by a majority vote at an election. CAL.
CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 4.
147. Lutz, supra note 144, at 260. While Lutz's methodology has various
limitations, there is strong support for the overall impressionistic result that
most states have constitutions that are amended readily in practice, whereas
the United States Constitution is extremely difficult to amend. In particular,
Lutz's treatment of multiple amendment paths suffers from serious problems.
Lutz calculates an index of difficulty based on a variety of factors. If there are
multiple paths to amendment, as there are in almost all states, he uses the
single easiest path, an average of all of the paths, or a weighted average of the
paths, depending on circumstances. Id. at 256-60. That has the incongruous
effect of producing an index of difficulty to a state that has multiple paths to
amendment that is at least as high as the index for the easiest method and
sometimes higher. The most natural assumption, in contrast, is that multiple
different methods would make the overall difficulty of amendment lower
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A simple taxonomy of state constitutional amendment
processes supports the conclusion that state constitutions are
readily amendable. 148 Ten states permit amendment by a simple
majority vote in the legislature ratified by a majority vote of the
people on a referendum.149 Twelve states allow the legislature to
propose amendments with two consecutive majority votes followed
by a majority vote of the people to ratify the amendments.16 0
Fourteen states permit the voters to initiate an amendment by
petition and ratify it by a simple majority vote. 15 1 Nevada permits
amendment by initiative ratified by two consecutive general

because groups seeking an amendment will pursue the specific method of
amendment that they view as easiest, which may vary depending on issue,
political situation, and so forth. Lutz might be correct that that behavior does
not in fact produce the expected result, but he fails to justify his conclusion.
See generally Lutz, supra note 144. Moreover, his entire system of indices
appears to rely heavily on ad hoc judgments about difficulty, without solid
evidence to support the complicated structure. See generally Lutz, supra note
144.
148. Some states require special procedures for constitutional "revisions" as
opposed to amendments. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 4. The
following discussion limits its consideration to methods that can be used for
amendments and does not point out which states have higher requirements for
revisions. Similarly, some states insulate one or more provisions in their
constitutions from the ordinary amendment process. I do not catalogue those
provisions.
149. ARIZ. CONST. art. XXI, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22; MINN. CONST.
art. IX, § 1; MO. CONST. art. XII, §§ 2(a), 2(b); N.M. CONST. art. XIX, § 1; N.D.
CONST. art. IV, § 16; OKLA. CONST. art. XXIV, § 1; OR. CONST. art. XVII, § 1;
R.I. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. XXIII, §§ 1, 3.
150. CONN. CONST. art. XII, amended by CONN. CONST. amend. art. VI; HAW.
CONST. art. XVII, § 3; IND. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. X, § 1;
MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. IV, §§ 4-5 (J. Sess. Leg.); NEV. CONST. art. XVI,
§ 1; N.J. CONST. art. IX; N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 1; PENN. CONST. art. XI, § 1;
TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3; VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
151. ARIZ. CONST. art. XXI, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1, amended by ARK.
CONST. amend. 7; CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b), art. XVIII, §§ 3, 4; COLO. CONST.
art. V, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3 (limited topics); MICH. CONST. art. XII,
§ 2; MISS. CONST. art. XV, § 273; MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 49, 50, art. XII, § 2(b);
MONT. CONST. art. XIV, § 9; NEB. CONST. art. 111-2, 111-4; N.D. CONST. art III,
H§ 8, 9; OKLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 2, 3, and art. XXIV, § 3; OR. CONST. art. IV,
§ 1; S.D. CONST. art. XXIII, §§ 1, 3. Note that Mississippi's requirements for a
constitutional initiative petition cannot currently be fulfilled-in order to
qualify for the ballot, a certain number of signatures must be collected in each
of five Congressional Districts. Since the 2000 reapportionment, Mississippi
has had only four Congressional Districts. MEMBER WEBSITE LISTING (BY
STATE), UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 111TH CONGRESS, 2ND
SESSION, available at http://www.house.gov/house/MemberWWW -byState.sht
ml#ms. Massachusetts also permits the people to propose amendments on a
limited range of topics through a petition; if at least one quarter of the state
legislature votes in support of the amendment, it can then be ratified by a
majority vote of the people. MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. IV, §§ 4, 5, art.
LXXXI, § 1.
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election majority votes. 152 All told, twenty-eight states permit
constitutional amendments by some combination of one or more
majority votes of the legislature, an initiative petition, and one or
more majority votes on a referendum, without any supermajority
vote requirements.1 53
Some states require supermajoritarian
support for
constitutional amendments, but even in those cases, the hurdles
are usually not particularly high. A majority of the states (twentyseven) permit amendments to their constitutions through a
supermajority vote in the legislature followed by a majority vote of
the people on a referendum, 15 4 but many of those states also
permit easier means of amendment. 15 5 Florida always requires a
supermajority (sixty percent) vote on a referendum to ratify a
constitutional amendment, but the Florida Constitution provides
for numerous different mechanisms to propose a constitutional
amendment to the people.156 Delaware, unique among the states,
allows for amendment by the state legislature without the direct
involvement of the people of the state-the legislature must pass a
proposed amendment by a two-third majority both before and after
an election for its members.15 7 New Hampshire probably has the
hardest constitution to amend; an amendment must receive a
three-fifth majority in each house of the legislature and then be
passed by a two-third majority of the voters at an election. 5 8 New
152. NEV. CONST. art. XIX, § 2.
153. See supra notes 149 -152 (explaining the process for constitutional
amendment in selected states).
154. ALA. CONST. art. XVIII, § 284, amended by ALA. CONST. amend. 24;
ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 4; COLO. CONST.
art. XIX, § 2; CONN. CONST. art. XII, amended by CONN. CONST. amend. art.
VI; GA. CONST. art. X, para. 2; HAW. CONST. art. XVII, § 3; IDAHO CONST. art.
XX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; KAN. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; KY. CONST. § 256;
LA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. X, § 4; MD. CONST. art. XIV, § 1;
MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. XV, § 273; MONT. CONST. art.
XIV, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. XVI-1; N.J. CONST. art. IX; N.C. CONST. art. XIII,
§ 4; OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 1; PENN. CONST. art. XI, § 1(a); TEX. CONST. art.
XVII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. XXIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. XXIII, § 1; W. VA.
CONST. art. XIV, § 14-2; WYO. CONST. art. XX, § 1 (97-20-001). South Carolina
requires a supermajority vote in its legislature, a majority vote of the people in
a referendum, and then a subsequent majority vote in the legislature. S.C.
CONST. art. XVI, § 1. Vermont requires a supermajority in the state Senate
with a majority vote in the state House, followed by a majority vote in both
houses of the legislature in the following session, and then ratification by a
majority vote in a referendum. VT. CONST. § 72.
155. Compare supra note 154 with supra note 149-152 (comparing states not
requiring a supermajority to state that do).
156. FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-7.
157. DEL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
158. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. C. Lutz concludes that the Delaware
Constitution is the hardest state constitution to amend, with an amendment
index of 3.6. Lutz, supra note 144, at 260. According to his formula, New
Hampshire would have an amendment index of roughly 3.25.
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Hampshire and Florida are outliers, however, in requiring a
supermajority vote of the people to ratify. In the other forty-seven
states besides Delaware, New Hampshire, and Florida, the people
can ratify constitutional amendments through simple majority
votes, although in some cases a supermajority vote of the
legislature is necessary to put the amendment before the people.159
In addition to the regular amendment processes, thirty-nine states
explicitly permit constitutional conventions to amend their
constitutions. 1 60 Finally, some state supreme courts have
recognized the power of the people to amend or replace their
constitutions through an extratextual mechanism. 161
State courts should be more willing to invalidate statutes as
violating the state constitution precisely because of the ease with
which state constitutions can be amended. When the federal courts
invalidate a law as unconstitutional, they have essentially the
final word. The Supreme Court, in particular, should thus act with
caution, lest it impose its substantive preferences on the nation
159. See supra notes 149-155 and accompanying text.
160. ALA. CONST. art. XVIII, § 286, amended by ALA. CONST. amend. 714;
ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, §§ 2-4; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXI, § 2; CAL. CONST. art.
XVIII, §§ 2, 4; COLO. CONST. art. XIX, § 1; CONN. CONST. art. XIII; DEL.
CONST. art. XVI, § 2; FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 4-5; GA. CONST. art. X, para. 4;
HAW. CONST. art. XVII, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. XX, §§ 3-4; ILL. CONST. art.
XIV, § 1; IOWA CONST., art. X, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; KY. CONST.
§§ 258-263; LA. CONST. art. XIII, § 2; MD. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; MICH. CONST.
art. XII, § 3; MINN. CONST. art. IX, §§ 2-3; MO. CONST. art. XII, §§ 3(a), 3(c);
MONT. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 1, 2, 3, 7; NEB. CONST. art. XVI-2; NEV. CONST. art.
XVI, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. C; N.M. CONST. art. XIX, § 2; N.Y. CONST.
art. XIX, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 1, 3; OHIO CONST. art. XVII, §§ 2-3;
OKLA. CONST. art. XXIV, § 2; R.I. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. XVI,
§ 3; S.D. CONST. art. XXIII, §§ 2-3; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3; UTAH CONST.
art. XXIII, §§ 2-3; VA. CONST. art. XII, § 2; WASH. CONST. art. XXIII, §§ 2-3; W.
VA. CONST. art. XIV, § 14-1; WIsC. CONST. art. XII, § 2; WYO. CONST. art. XX,
§§ 3-4 (97-20-003 and 004).
161. Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1966); Wheeler v. Bd. of
Trs., 37 S.E.2d 322 (Ga. 1946); In re Op. to the Governor, 178 A. 433 (R.I.
1935). A few state constitutions specifically forbid amendment by any process
other than the ones contained in the text of the constitution. See, e.g., Mo.
CONST. art. XII, § 1 ("This constitution may be revised or amended only as
therein provided."). While some scholars have argued for the availability of
extratextual means of amending the United States Constitution, see, for
example, BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: VOL. 1, FOUNDATIONS (1991);
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: VOL. 2, TRANSFORMATIONS (1998);
Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION 50-61 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (positing one such
extratextual means of amendment); and Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia
Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1043, 1044 (1988) (positing another such means of amendment), their thesis
has been hotly contested. See, e.g., David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We
Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1990) (rejecting
extratextual means of amendment and embracing the majoritarian values
behind the amendment process).
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without adequate justification. 16 2 In contrast, when the California
Supreme Court invalidates a law, it acts as part of an ongoing
dialogue with the people of California over what the state
constitution means. If the people disagree with the Court, they can
overturn its decisions with relative ease.16 Notably, while a
vanishingly small number of federal Supreme Court decisions
have been overturned by explicit constitutional amendments,
many state supreme court decisions have been reversed by the will
of the people. 164 Precisely because their decisions are not final in
the sense that the people can respond effectively, state supreme
courts can decide constitutional cases without the same degree of
caution that ought to attach to the awesome power of the United
States Supreme Court to interpret the federal Constitution.
The difference between the difficulty in amending state
constitutions and amending the federal Constitution suggests that
state courts should be more willing to strike down statutes in
cases of first impression but also more bound by stare decisis.
When a state court faces a novel issue-as many courts have in
the context of same-sex marriage-they can act with less deference
to the elected branches than the federal courts ought to exhibit
162. The vast literature on the counter-majoritarian difficulty addresses
precisely this issue. See generally ELY, supra note 127; ALEXANDER BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
(1958). In addition to the classic framing in terms of the counter-majoritarian
difficulty, a recent body of scholarship has focused on ideas of popular
constitutionalism and mechanisms for the people or the political branches to
constrain the federal judiciary's interpretation of the Constitution. See
generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); JAMIN B. RASKIN,
OVERRULING DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
(2004); MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS (1999); Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, Legislative

Constitutionalism and Section Five Power, 112 YALE L.J. 2059 (2003). In
contrast, Barry Friedman has argued in several recent works that dialogue
between the people and the federal courts about the meaning of the
Constitution is already effective and that the courts are more constrained by
popular opinion than they appear. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE passim (2009); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91
MICH. L. REV. 653, 653 (1993). Friedman acknowledges, however, that
disparities between the Court's interpretation of the Constitution and the
people's preferences can endure for substantial periods, sometimes as much as
decades. FRIEDMAN, supra,at 167-236. As the Supreme Court's diffuse support
grows, its ability to act against the will of the people in relatively low-salience
areas increases substantially. Id. at 377-81.
163. See generally Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a
Theory of State ConstitutionalMeanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 983 (1998-99).
164. See John Dinan, Foreword: Court-ConstrainingAmendments and the
State Constitutional Tradition, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 983 (2007) (contrasting the
between four and seven instances of federal constitutional amendments
intended to overturn Supreme Court decisions with numerous examples of
state constitutional amendments with the same goal).
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precisely because of the ability of the people to overturn their
decisions. Thus, if a state constitution has an equal rights
amendment or an equal protection clause that has been
interpreted more broadly than the Fourteenth Amendment, a state
court should be more willing to take that clause at its word and
carry through its logical consequences, even if that requires
striking down a law passed by the legislature. But at the same
time, the federal courts should apply stare decisis less vigorously
in cases where prior courts have struck down statutes to avoid
perpetuating the dead hand of the past without any means of
checking it. If a state's constitutional interpretations include
conclusions that are no longer acceptable to the people of that
state, the standard response should be an amendment. In an
analogous situation in the federal context, amendment will usually
be a forlorn hope, rendered impossible by the massively
supermajoritarian requirements of Article V.165
The role for more stringent applications of state constitutional
requirements, however, only works if courts do not create
additional barriers to the amendment process. If the Equal
Protection Clause or the Guarantee Clause were interpreted to
prevent any amendments that roll back decisions permitting
same-sex marriages, then state supreme courts would need to
approach the issue with the same deference to the legislature-the
same recognition of the tension between their duty to the majority
and their duty to minorities-that constrains the federal courts.
When amendment remains easy, they can act with less deference
to the political branches, confident that the people can correct
them if they go beyond what the people would approve.
A. The Benefits of Dialogue between State Courts and the People
The back-and-forth process of stringent state court
application of constitutional provisions followed by popular
responses has a valuable function in pursuing just policy. State
courts applying state constitutions have been much more willing
to hold that a right to same-sex marriage exists than federal
courts applying the United States Constitution or than state
legislatures
making
political
decisions.
The
Hawaii,
Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, and Iowa Supreme Courts
have all issued decisions either permitting same-sex marriages or
165. Article V requires a two-thirds majority of both houses of Congress,
followed by ratification by either the legislatures or special conventions in
three-quarters of the states to amend the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. V.
While Article V also permits a constitutional convention called by application
of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states, it still requires ratification by
three-quarters of the states. The convention means of amending the
Constitution has, of course, never been used since the adoption of the
Constitution in 1787.

1000

The John Marshall Law Review

[43:963

suggesting that the state constitution might invalidate bans on
same-sex marriages, and the Vermont Supreme Court required
civil unions that provide the same state benefits as marriage.166
Those decisions, especially the early decisions, came in a context
where permitting same-sex marriage was not even a matter of
serious political discussion. The earliest state court decisions in
Alaska and Hawaii were promptly overturned by constitutional
amendments, 67 but not before they began a transformative
process for the whole dialogue over gay rights. After the Vermont
Supreme Court's decision, popular sentiment began shifting, with
many more people supporting at least civil unions. In much of the
country, the conversation ceased to be whether same-sex couples
were entitled to any legal recognition, but rather whether civil
unions were sufficient.
To be sure, much of the country's population continues to
oppose same-sex marriages and even civil unions.s6 8 Likewise, a
major component of the shift in attitudes has been demographic,
as younger voters who tend to support same-sex marriage rights
make up more of the population and elderly opponents of same-sex
marriage die. 169 Even so, the decisions of state courts have greatly
facilitated the public discussion. Far from constitutional decisions
serving to move overly difficult issues off the public agenda,170
state constitutional decisions have forced the people to struggle to
reconcile their abstract commitment to notions of equal rights with
their internal commitments to oppose same-sex marriage. Robust
political activism and public debate now characterizes the issue of
same-sex marriage. Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire, and the
District of Columbia recently legalized same-sex marriage through
ordinary legislation, although the people of Maine subsequently
invalidated its same-sex marriage statute through a "people's

166. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 862; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 407; In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d at 384; Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 941
(Mass. 2003); Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Baehr, 852 P.2d at
44.
167. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
168. See Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life and Pew Research Center for
the People & the Press, Most Still Oppose Same-Sex Marriage, Majority
Continues to Support Civil Unions: Results from the 2009 Annual Religion and
Public Life Survey (Oct. 9, 2009), available at http://pewforum.org/newasset
s/images/reports/samesexmarriage09/samesexmarriageO9.pdf (noting that
fifty-three percent oppose same-sex marriages, while fifty-seven percent
support civil unions).
169. Id. at 5 (showing much stronger support for legal same-sex marriages
among youngest age group and decreasing support with each increase in age).
170. See, e.g., Stephen Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 19-23 (Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (addressing why certain topics are not
discussed).
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72
veto."171 Several other states may follow in the next few years.1

In other states, public attitudes that once strongly opposed samesex marriages have shifted. And in Massachusetts and
Connecticut, populations that at one time opposed same-sex
marriages have shifted to supporting the legal regime imposed by
the state supreme courts.
Indeed, judicial interpretation of state constitutions can
provide a majoritarian role as well. Evidence suggests that
legislation protecting the rights of gays and lesbians typically does
not pass without substantially more than majority support.173
When well-organized interest groups oppose gay and lesbian
rights, even larger popular majorities are necessary to produce
legislative action.174 Court decisions rigorously applying general
principles to the specific case of gay and lesbian rights may thus,
at least in some instances, result in policies favored by a majority
1 75
The
of the people yet unable to pass the legislature.
Massachusetts Supreme Court's decision permitting same-sex
marriage may have been an example of a state court decision
producing majoritarian results after the legislature failed to act,
although the evidence is not clear.176
At the same time, the ability of the voters of Alaska, Hawaii,
and California to reject their Supreme Courts' interpretations
preserves popular sovereignty and contributes to the legitimacy of
the state constitution. If the state supreme courts had the final
authoritative word on what equality means, many voters would
believe that the state government did not represent them at all.
Criticisms of "activist judges" would be entirely valid when applied
to judges who imposed their policy preferences in disregard for a
substantial majority's disagreement, with little chance of reversal.
Rejecting voter-initiated state constitutional amendments because
they reach the "wrong" result threatens the people's control over
their government.
171. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF
REFERENDUM
2009
COMMISSIONS,
ELECTIONS, AND
CORPORATIONS,

TABULATION (2009), available at http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/2009/refer
endumbycounty.html.
172. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, Advocates on Both Sides Seek Momentum
on Same-Sex Marriage,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/200
9/04/09/nyregion/09marriage.html (showing that momentum may have shifted
against same-sex marriage following the Maine referendum and Democratic
electoral defeats in the 2009 elections and the 2010 Massachusetts special
election). It is too early to be certain what the long-term effects will be.
173. Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the States: Public
Opinion and Policy Responsiveness, 103 AMER. POL. Scl. REV. 367, 383 (2009).

174. Id. at 378.
175. In states that permit initiatives, the initiative process might offer
another way to adopt policies supported by a majority of the people yet unable
to gain majority support in the legislature.
176. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 941.
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B. The Alternative to the FormalAmendment Process
In the end, the question is not whether the people of
California can reverse the Supreme Court's decision in In re
Marriage Cases; rather, the question is whether they can do so

through the formal amendment process. As Sanford Levinson
observed in discussing amendments of the United States
Constitution, the Constitution has in fact been amended many
more times through processes of judicial interpretation than
through formal amendment.177 If constitutional amendments like
Proposition 8 were invalidated, the result would be to require
opponents of same-sex marriage to pursue their goals by
attempting to change the composition of the California Supreme
Court, rather than by amending the state constitution. Indeed,
before the court decided Strauss, some supporters of Proposition 8
predicted recall or non-retention campaigns against members of
the California Supreme Court if the Court had classified
Proposition 8 as a revision, and thus invalid without legislative
involvement, as opposed to an amendment. 178
The saga of California's death penalty jurisprudence provides
a useful cautionary tale. The California Supreme Court concluded
that the death penalty violated the state constitution's ban on
"cruel or unusual punishment" in People v. Anderson.179 The
people of California responded with a constitutional amendment
overturning Anderson. 80 Up to that point, the system had worked

smoothly, with the state Supreme Court and the people engaged in
a dialogue. In the 1980s, however, many people became convinced
that a majority of the Court would strike down any death
penalty-finding some reason in each case to declare the sentence
invalid.18 1 An organized campaign opposed the retention of several
Supreme Court Justices with the death penalty as the principal
campaign issue, although business interests that opposed the
justices for other reasons funded much of the campaign. 182
California voters ultimately removed Chief Justice Rose Bird and
Justices Cruz Reynoso and Joseph Grodin in the retention election
177. Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution
Been Amended? (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) > 27: Accounting for Constitutional
Change, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 14-24 (Sanford Levinson ed.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1995).
178. Maura Dolan, Court is Feeling the Heat on Prop. 8, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/19/local/me-prop8-supreme-courtl9;
see also CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 13-15 (providing for recall), art. VI, § 16(d)(1)
(providing for judicial retention elections).
179. Anderson, 493 P.2d at 880, 891, 899.
180. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27.
181. See John H. Culver & Chantel Boyens, Political Cycles of Life and
Death: Capital Punishment as Public Policy in California,65 ALB. L. REV. 991,
1003 (2002) (showing a shift in the political makeup of the court).

182. Id.
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of 1986.183

In the November 2010 election, the Iowa voters voted against
retaining three of the Iowa Supreme Court Justices who were part
of the unanimous Varnum Court, which recognized a right to
same-sex marriage in that state. 184 The campaign against their
retention focused on the decision in Varnum, and observers
generally attributed the result of the election-the first in the
history of Iowa's retention elections when an incumbent Supreme
Court Justice was not retained 18 5-to a backlash motivated by
opposition to the decision.186 The irony of the results of the Iowa
Supreme Court retention election is that it has no direct effect on
the legal status of same-sex marriage-Varnum remains binding
precedent in Iowa, and a majority of the Varnum Court remains.
The net effect of the decision, however, may be to deter future
courts from interpreting their Constitutions as broadly as they
would have otherwise.
If the California Supreme Court had invalidated Proposition 8
in Strauss, some would have concluded that the only viable way to
overturn a Supreme Court decision is by removing enough justices
to tip the balance of voting. While "throwing the bums out" is a
perfectly normal and appropriate response to disliked decisions by
political actors, it raises troubling issues of infringing judicial
independence and threatening the rule of law when applied to
judges. 187 Allowing voters to instead overturn judicial decisions
through the amendment process allows the courts and the voters
to have a fruitful dialogue about fundamental values while not
reducing the courts to simply another political branch.
C. Striking the Right Balance

Allowing state constitutional amendments to overturn state
supreme court decisions, while at the same time providing legal
guarantees for the rights of minorities to participate in the
political process, strikes the right balance between protecting the
183. Id.
184. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862; A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa
Judges Sends Signal to the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at Al.
185. Grant Schulte, Iowans Dismiss Three Justices, DES MOINES REGISTER
(Nov. 3, 2010), available at http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/2010110
3/NEWSO9/11030390/1007/news05/Iowans-dismiss-three-justices.
186. See, e.g., id.; Sulzberger, supra note 184.
187. See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the Size of the
Supreme Court, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 645, 651-54 (2009) (discussing impartiality
and independence as core values for the judiciary); John A. Ferejohn & Larry
D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing
Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 965-76 (2002) (discussing the
concept of judicial independence and its importance within the legal system);
David E. Pozen, The Irony of JudicialElections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 270296 (2008) (discussing the canonical virtues and vices of judicial elections).
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rights of minorities and empowering the people as a whole. To the
extent that state constitutional amendments purport to eliminate
the ability of the legislatures to authorize same-sex marriage,
invalidating those amendments under the Equal Protection Clause
protects the political rights of minorities. At the same time,
permitting an amendment to overturn decisions like In re
Marriage Cases still allows opponents of same-sex marriage to
avoid having equality imposed by the courts without any
democratic process. Opponents of same-sex marriage would be
free, of course, to use the ballot box as the traditional check
against elected officials adopting policies that they oppose, thus
structuring public debate over same-sex marriage into part of the
ordinary political process.
The lack of any serious entrenchment of current views
provides a key reason for why state constitutional amendments
adopted by simple majorities should nonetheless be able to
overturn state court decisions expanding the rights of minorities.
Despite its sweeping language, Proposition 8 does not permanently
end same-sex marriage in California as a practical matter even
without taking into account the fundamental right to participate
in the political process argument. Instead, Proposition 8 merely
bans same-sex marriages until a new majority replaces it with a
different constitutional amendment. Gathering large numbers of
signatures and winning a state-wide initiative vote is far from
easy, but I am confident that if sentiment in California shifts so
that a clear majority supports permitting same-sex marriages,
Proposition 8 will be repealed.
Supermajority requirements to amend constitutions pose a
much more difficult problem because they can allow a transient
supermajority to impose its will on a contrary majority in the
future rather than allowing the people to make binding precommitments to improve decision-making in a crisis. To be sure,
supermajority requirements make the initial decision to amend a
constitution harder to reach, but when a supermajority exists
temporarily, it can use the constitutional amendment process to
lock-up the political process against future changes in opinion.
Constitutional provisions are often understood as democratic precommitment strategies.188 Like Odysseus sailing past the sirens,
the people tie themselves to a constitutional mast to avoid
temptation during a crisis. Thus, because the people know that
they will be tempted to run budget deficits and to pass the bill for
their spending on to their children, they might adopt a state
constitutional requirement of a balanced budget with heavily
188. See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS (2d ed., 1984)
(discussing how judges interpret the Constitution and public opinion); Jed
Rubenfeld, Of Constitutional Self-Government, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749
(2003) (discussing how judges interpret the Constitution and public opinion).
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constrained access to bond markets.18 9 Likewise, because the
people know that they may be tempted to seek scapegoats in a
crisis and to punish someone when things go wrong, they adopt
bans on ex post facto laws to pre-commit to the principles of rule of
law before the crisis arises.19 0
The standard arguments in favor of democratic precommitment strategies have little force when the pre-commitment
is a commitment against minority rights or an effort to entrench
the views of the day on a hotly contested social issue. The
justification for pre-commitment is that we need to take certain
options off the table when we consider them calmly and
dispassionately because we fear that we will make the wrong
decision when confronted with a crisis. Efforts at entrenchment of
the current majority's viewpoints have an entirely different feelthe fear is not that "we the people" will decide issues poorly in a
crisis, but rather that "they" will gain control of the government
and do something that we currently consider undesirable. The
difference between protecting against the majority's tendency to
make poor decisions in the heat of the moment and an effort to
ensure that the current majority's decisions bind the future means
the difference between the category of pre-commitments and that
of attempts to lock-up the political process.
Some theorists would instead focus on a Burkean function in
constitutional provisions. 191 Under that approach, the purpose of a
constitution is, at least in part, to preserve certain values against
changing norms. If some reason existed to believe that the
traditional values of a constitution were necessarily correct, then
entrenchment might become a valuable feature in its own right,
preserving the underlying values. The difficulty with this
approach is that it assumes a reason to believe that the status quo
(or more accurately the status quo ante) is morally superior to the
views of the current population. People who believe in the idea of
progress or Martin Luther King Jr.'s aphorism that "the are of the
moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice," 192 would

189. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XVI (limiting bond issues to specific purposes

and otherwise requiring a balanced budget). The California Constitution even
goes so far as to attempt to render its restriction on bond issues unamendable.
Id. § 2. Many economists would argue that balanced budget requirements
have negative effects on fiscal policy, resulting in government policy that
increases the severity of the business cycle. But while balanced budget
requirements may be poor policy, they remain easy to explain within the
context of a broader concern about pre-commitment to policies.
190. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9 (providing for prohibition on bills of
attainder, ex post facto laws, and contract-inhibiting laws).
191. See e.g., Ward Fransworth, The Regulation of Turnover on the Supreme
Court, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 407, 411-21 (2005) (reflecting on judicial life
tenure).
192. Martin Luther King Jr., Our God is Marching On (Mar. 25, 1965),
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quickly reject the idea that we should entrench values in
constitutions to protect them against future changes. But even
without a belief in the necessity of progress, a long tradition in
American legal thought rejects the idea that we should substitute
the dry papers of the past for the democracy of the living. Thomas
Jefferson famously supported a new generation every nineteen
years so that no generation would be ruled illegitimately by the
decisions of previous generations. 93 While few would go as far as
Jefferson's position, many would agree with his basic proposition
that "[t]he earth belongs always to the living generation."194 We
have no objective means to determine whether today's majority is
superior or inferior to yesterday's majority. And so, except under
circumstances when concepts of deliberate pre-commitment make
sense, we seek to allow today's majority to control.
Focusing on issues of valid pre-commitment versus invalid
attempts to entrench a current majority's view on future
majorities provides the key to unraveling the question of what
sorts of minority groups should be entitled to protection by
Hunter's right of political participation. When a constitutional
provision eliminates substantive rights, especially the rights of a
minority, directly, it functions as an attempt to lock-up the
political process. Conversely, when the constitutional provision
has the feeling of limiting the majority's own right to set policy,
particularly in response to a crisis, that functions as a valid precommitment. The distinction between Gordon and Hunter makes
sense when analyzed through this lens. Gordon represents an
effort to limit government spending-a perfectly normal, although
in that case arguably poorly considered, effort to pre-commit to
small government and to not raising taxes except when the people
make a super-majority decision. Hunter, conversely, represents an
effort to entrench the powers of the current majority and to
maintain the current racial hierarchy. Structural preavailableat http://www.mlkonline.net/ourgod.html.
193. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789),
available at http://odur.let.rug.nl/-usa/P/tj3/writings/brf/jefl8l.htm. It states:
On similar ground it may be proved that no society can make a
perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs
always to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what
proceeds from it, as they please, during their usufruct. They are masters
too of their own persons, and consequently may govern them as they
please. But persons and property make the sum of the objects of
government. The constitution and the laws of their predecessors
extinguished them, in their natural course, with those whose will gave
them being. This could preserve that being till it ceased to be itself, and
no longer. Every constitution, then, and every law, naturally expires at
the end of 19 years. If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force and not
of right.

Id.
194. Id.
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commitments that actually limit the majority as a whole are valid,
while efforts to constitutionally eliminate the right of participation
of a recognizable minority, regardless of whether the minority is a
suspect class, are invalid. Applying this analysis, constitutional
amendments that take away the ability of gays and lesbians to
seek same-sex marriage through ordinary political means fall well
within the category of proscribed efforts to entrench a current
majority position, rather than efforts to pre-commit on the
majority's decisions. The distinction between pre-commitment and
entrenchment can be slippery in some individual cases, as the
distinction between process-based protections and substantive
concerns always is,195 but it provides a sensible framework with

which to analyze the distinction between cases like Hunter and a
hypothetical challenge to Proposition 8, on the one hand, and cases
like Gordon, on the other.
The distinction between pre-commitment and entrenchment
provides a strong albeit imperfect justification for the limitation of
Hunter to independently identifiable groups. When an
independently identifiable group is excluded from the political
process, the effect is to fence them out and entrench the current
majorities distaste for the group's goals. A constitutional rule,
with
a
entrenched
rule
a
constitutional
especially
supermajoritarian amendment process, ensures that even if the
group grows in size and develops allies beyond its membership, it
will be unable to achieve its goals without supermajority support.
That raises all of the troubling concerns about entrenching a
current majority's preferences against the interests of a changing
polity. Conversely, when the only way to define the excluded group
is in terms of policy preferences, the excluded group is necessarily
part of "us"-the exclusion is a limitation on our policy choices, not
an effort to ensure that an undesirable "they" does not gain power.
If Hunter establishes a right to political access that would
invalidate any state constitutional amendment that takes away
the power of the legislature to create same-sex marriages, the
actions of the supermajority cannot have any greater oppressive
effect on a minority than the action of a majority can. A
supermajority adopting a constitutional amendment, just like a
majority, can check the actions of the state courts, but under a
correct interpretation of Hunter, it cannot take away the ordinary
political rights of the minority. The people can participate in a
dialogue with the courts about what fundamental rights the state
constitution protects, but they cannot take away the right of a
different future majority to revisit those conclusions. Hunter and

195. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1071 (1980) (describing the
interrelated nature of process and substance).
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its progeny, broadly understood, strike the right balance between
protecting the supremacy of the people and preventing current
majorities from entrenching their transient beliefs on future
populations with different views.
V.

CONCLUSION

Constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage
provides a troubling test for people who want to preserve the
political rights and full citizenship of gays and lesbians while also
preserving the political power of the people as a whole to control
their courts. If we read Equal Protection cases like Hunter and
Seattle School District No. I as protecting a fundamental right to
political participation for all discrete groups, not just suspect
classes, current doctrine resolves the tension between minority
rights and majority control correctly. The majority has the right to
bring the state courts to heel but not to eliminate the right of the
minority to seek reforms through the ordinary legislative process.
That balance also produces the right result in terms of
encouraging a productive dialogue between courts and the people.
State courts can interpret their constitutions aggressively,
spurring debate and presenting compelling arguments based on
equality, without facing the countermajoritarian difficulty posed
by a small group of justices imposing their beliefs on the people
without any effective check. The back-and-forth over same-sex
marriage provides a perfect example of how that process of
dialogue can serve as a means to achieve not merely transient
legal equality but ultimately legal equality supported by a
majority of the people. An extended process of dialogue may not be
as fast or as smooth as many people would wish, but it promises a
better ultimate result than the imposition of a legal regime that
the majority of the people would consider illegitimate.

